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CODIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE 
DOCTRINE: AGENCY RESPONSE AND CERTAIN 
OTHER UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES 
REBECCA ROSENBERG? 
ABSTRACT 
Section 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code incorporates 
the controversial judicial doctrine of economic substance into statu-
tory language. In other words, it “codifies” the doctrine. (The eco-
nomic substance doctrine generally provides that a tax benefit that 
goes beyond Congressional intent can be disallowed by the courts, 
even if the taxpayer meets all of the literal Code and regulatory 
requirements for claiming the benefit.) 
This codification appears to have accidentally dissuaded 
the relevant agency (the Internal Revenue Service, or IRS) from 
raising economic substance issues—an effect that is contrary to 
Congress’s intent in enacting the doctrine into legislation. Essen-
tially, Congress imported a set of judicial principles into the Code, 
in order to make a particular judicial doctrine stronger, but then 
the agency effectively discarded those now-codified judicial rules. 
The IRS response to codification raises bigger picture issues, 
such as an agency’s ability to disregard (or decline to enforce) a 
statute and the parameters of an agency’s ability to issue public 
guidance using informal means (rather than formal regulations). 
In addition, this codification raises structural issues, including 
the interaction between the three branches of government in this 
context and the impact of Congressional approval on arguments 
about the validity of this judicial doctrine. Lastly, such codification 
places new emphasis on distinguishing between the now-codified 
economic substance doctrine and other anti-abuse doctrines. 
The economic substance doctrine has been the subject of 
recent litigation in the “STARS” cases. One of such cases has just 
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been appealed to the Eighth Circuit, and that appeal may later 
result in a split between the circuits. In addition, the recent 2017 
Tax Act (the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) may lead to more emphasis 
on the economic substance doctrine, as taxpayers attempt to comply 
with the letter of new tax provisions while arguably circumvent-
ing such provisions’ intent. For these reasons, the economic sub-
stance doctrine is likely to become increasingly important in the 
near future. In addition, as the IRS attempts to implement and 
provide guidance on a massive new tax act, there are likely to be 
recurring issues regarding the limits of agency discretion to not 
enforce a statute, and the use of informal means to communicate 
guidance to the public. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Section 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19861 (the 
Code) imported the judicial doctrine of economic substance into 
statutory language, with some changes.2 Under this long-standing 
doctrine, the courts can disallow a tax benefit that is contrary to 
Congressional intent, even if all of the statutory and regulatory 
requirements for claiming the benefit are met.3 
Section 7701(o) is thus a set of legislative rules about the 
content of a substantive judicial doctrine, and it gives the agency 
(for the first time) the ability to issue guidance governing the 
application of this doctrine.4 This Article addresses section 
7701(o)’s unintended impact on the IRS, and certain other con-
sequences of the codification (placement into the Internal Reve-
nue Code) of the economic substance doctrine. 
First, the Article discusses the IRS’s response to section 
7701(o): codification seems to have inadvertently deterred the IRS 
from raising economic substance issues, which in turn prevents 
such issues from reaching the courts.5 This deterrence is especially 
ironic because it follows government successes in using the doc-
trine in court,6 and because section 7701(o) gives the IRS, for the 
                                                                                                            
1 I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2012). 
2 Id. § 7701(o). See generally Rebecca Rosenberg, Codification of the Economic 
Substance Doctrine: Substantive Impact and Unintended Consequences, 15 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab 
stract_id=3158795 (discussing changes that section 7701(o) made to the eco-
nomic substance doctrine). 
3 See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Bank of N.Y. Mellon 
Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 107, 125 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. 
136 S. Ct. 1375 (2016) (citing Gregory to show that the doctrine is aimed at dis-
cerning whether a claimed tax benefit is consistent with Congressional intent). 
See generally Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 5 (2000) (discussing the history of the economic substance doctrine). 
4 See § 7701(o). 
5 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); 
see also Lee A. Sheppard, IRS Repeal of the Economic Substance Statute, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Feb. 21, 2012, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes/tax-system 
-administration-issues/news-analysis-irs-repeal-economic-substance-statute 
/2012/02/20/qq00. 
6 See, e.g., Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844 F.3d 15, 26 
(1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4194 (June 26, 2017); Bank of 
N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 107; Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 
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first time, the ability to affect the content of the economic substance 
doctrine by means of guidance.7 Yet codification has instead 
resulted in IRS reluctance to apply the doctrine.8 This is appar-
ently because the IRS is averse to applying the penalties that were 
enacted with codification and that are now mandatory when lack 
of economic substance causes a tax deficiency.9 
Among other things, this situation clearly raises issues about 
the parameters of an agency’s discretion to decline to apply a 
statute. In this case, such non-application contradicts Congress’s 
clear intent to make the economic substance doctrine more effec-
tive.10 This Article discusses those issues and also considers 
whether an agency’s authority to disregard a statute differs (practi-
cally speaking) when the agency’s action favors (rather than 
disadvantages) taxpayers. If no one is likely to object to agency 
action, are there any limits to agency authority? 
In addition, the IRS has used informal communication to 
issue de facto guidance regarding the economic substance statute, 
in two different contexts. First, the IRS has expressed its aversion 
to applying the economic substance doctrine by issuing written 
instructions that impose heavy requirements for IRS employees 
to meet before they can raise the doctrine.11 Those written in-
structions are available to the public.12 Secondly, the IRS has 
                                                                                                            
932, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1366 (2016); Wells Fargo & 
Co. v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1142 (D. Minn. 2017), appeal 
docketed, No. 17-3578, No. 17-3676 (8th Cir. Nov. 24, 2017). These cases are 
collectively referred to as the STARS cases. 
7 See §§ 7701(o), 7805(a) (2012). 
8 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 
2011). See generally Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Case Against a Strict Liabil-
ity Economic Substance Penalty, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 445, 466–67 (2011). 
9 See §§ 6662(b)(6), (c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015). 
10 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443(I), at 295 (2010). 
11 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 
2011). This directive only applies to the Large Business and International (LB&I) 
division of the IRS. 
12 See generally U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989). 
These IRS instructions to IRS employees are easily available online. See, e.g., 
Heather C. Maloy, Guidance for Examiners and Managers on the Codified Eco-
nomic Substance Doctrine and Related Penalties, A.B.A. (July 15, 2011), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/taxation/taxiq-fall11-dillon 
-irs-guidance-paper.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXK8-PFRK]. 
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issued a notice stating that it will continue to follow pre-codification 
descriptions of the two prongs of the economic substance doc-
trine until further guidance is issued.13 That may not be a valid 
interpretation of the statute.14 These letters and the notice (and 
an additional notice on section 7701(o))15 are relied on by taxpayers, 
and are treated by practitioners as if they were binding agency 
guidance.16 But these communications are issued without formal 
notice and comment procedures and with very limited public in-
put.17 These uses of informal communication to implement policy 
decisions about non-enforcement and about substantive interpreta-
tion raise issues about when informal guidance is appropriate.18 
Codification also pushes the IRS and the courts to use other 
anti-abuse doctrines instead of economic substance (in order to 
avoid the penalties now associated with the economic substance 
doctrine).19 In turn, this puts new pressure on distinguishing be-
tween the various anti-abuse doctrines, which tend to overlap.20 
Previously, there was little need to carefully differentiate be-
tween them, but that has now changed.21 
                                                                                                            
13 I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
14 See Rosenberg, supra note 2 (manuscript at 25). 
15 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
16 See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, Economic Substance Notice’s Sham Treatment 
Reverses LB&I Course, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 20, 2014, https://www.tax 
notes.com/tax-notes-today/penalties/economic-substance-notices-sham-treatment 
-reverses-lbi-course/2014/10/20/fly5 (reporting that practitioners treated Notice 
2014-58 as if it reversed actual guidance created by the second directive, and 
as if that directive had previously provided rules that taxpayers could rely on: 
“Practitioners are ... faulting the notice for its reversal of course on a prior 
IRS directive that exempted the sham transaction doctrine from being consid-
ered a ‘similar rule of law.’ ... [P]ractitioners ... had found relief in a 2011 Large 
Business and International Division directive ... that exempted the sham trans-
action doctrine from similar application”) (emphasis added). 
17 See Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance: Ensuring Input and 
Enhancing Participation, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 517, 547–51 (2012) (discussing ways 
the IRS issues informal guidance). 
18 See id. at 552. 
19 See infra Section III.B.1.a; see also Erik M. Jensen, Legislative and Regula-
tory Responses to Tax Avoidance: Explicating and Evaluating the Alterna-
tives, 57 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1, 31 (2012) (noting the IRS’s and courts’ power to use 
other anti-abuse doctrines). 
20 See infra Section III.B.1.b; see also Jensen, supra note 19, at 22–23. 
21 See infra Section III.B.1.b; see also Jensen, supra note 19, at 24–25. 
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Lastly, there is an issue as to whether codification ends 
questions about the validity of the economic substance doctrine. 
Such invalidity assertions  have been based either on arguments 
that the doctrine is an incorrect interpretation of historic case law22 
or on separation of powers concerns.23 This Article argues that 
codification puts to rest the former type of validity argument, but 
not the latter. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Brief Description of Pre-Codification Economic Substance  
Doctrine 
The economic substance doctrine is a long-standing, court-
created doctrine that essentially provides that tax benefits claimed 
under a provision of the Internal Revenue Code will not be re-
spected if they violate the intent of that provision, even if the 
taxpayer meets all of the literal Code and regulatory requirements 
for claiming such benefit.24 In other words, the doctrine allows 
the courts to override the literal words of the Code and regula-
tions, in favor of Congressional intent.25 If a transaction is found 
to lack economic substance, then all tax results of that transaction—
the claimed tax benefit, income, deductions, etc.—are disregarded 
                                                                                                            
22 See infra note 320 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Coltec Industries, 
Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 752 (2004) (suggesting that the Supreme 
Court in Gregory did not intend to create the economic substance doctrine as cur-
rently implemented), vacated and remanded, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
23 Rosenberg, supra note 2 (manuscript at 3 n.6). 
24 See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2215 (Mar. 5, 1997) 
(the doctrine addresses “tax benefits, unintended by Congress, by means of trans-
actions that serve no economic purpose other than tax savings”), aff’d, 157 
F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), and cert denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999). This description of 
the economic substance doctrine was cited, apparently with approval, by the 
House Report that accompanied section 7701(o); see H.R. REP. NO. 111-443(I), 
at 292 (2010); see also, e.g., Horn v. Comm’r, 968 F.2d 1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(“[T]he sham transaction doctrine seeks to identify a certain type of transac-
tion that Congress presumptively would not have intended to accord benefi-
cial tax treatment.”). 
25 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Bank of N.Y. 
Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2015); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 111-443(I), at 292–93; Joseph Bankman, supra note 3, at 8 n.4. (discussing 
the application of the doctrine). 
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for federal tax purposes, as if the transaction had never occurred.26 
However, if part of the challenged transaction is found to be sepa-
rable, and passes the economic substance test, such separable part 
(and its associated tax benefits) can be respected.27 
Judicial application of the economic substance doctrine, in 
hundreds of cases, generally involves examination of whether the 
challenged transaction was reasonably expected to generate a 
profit (or to otherwise have an economic effect), and also whether 
the taxpayer was subjectively motivated by more than just tax ben-
efits.28 In this two-step analysis, the inquiry regarding profit and 
economic effects is often called the objective prong.29 The subjec-
tive inquiry is often referred to as the business purpose prong or 
subjective analysis.30 
Different circuits describe their application of the economic 
substance doctrine in various ways.31 Some circuits apply a con-
junctive test, requiring that the taxpayer pass both the objective 
and subjective prongs before the transaction can be respected as 
                                                                                                            
26 See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 113; Compaq Computer 
Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); Alessandra v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 2768, 2771 (June 1, 1995). Arguments to the contrary were recently 
rejected by trial courts in the context of summary judgment motions in the 
Santander and Wells Fargo cases, respectively. See Santander Holdings USA, 
Inc. v. United States, 2018 WL 3448243 (D. Mass. July 17, 2018), summary 
judgement denied after remand, 844 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2016) (“A transaction’s 
lack of economic substance is broadly fatal to tax benefits that arise only because 
of the condemned contrivance.”); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 2017 WL 
4083148 (D. Minn. Sept. 15, 2017). See generally Amanda Athanasiou, No Sum-
mary Judgment for Santander in STARS Case, TAX NOTES INT’L (July 23, 2018). 
27 See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 124 (holding that a loan 
was separable from a related transaction that was an economic sham and finding 
that interest deductions therefore were allowable); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United 
States, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1146–47 (D. Minn. 2017). 
28 See Bankman, supra note 3, at 12. 
29 See id. 
30 Id. at 27. 
31 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443(I), at 293 (2010) (describing the differing ap-
proaches taken by various circuits); Jensen, supra note 19, at 26 (noting that cir-
cuits diverge on whether to apply the prongs conjunctively or not). See generally 
Amanda L. Yoder, Note, One Prong, Two Prong, Many Prongs: A Look into the 
Economic Substance Doctrine, 75 MO. L. REV. 1409, 1419–24 (2010) (describing in 
detail each circuit’s application of the doctrine). 
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having economic substance.32 Other circuits apply a disjunctive 
test, under which taxpayers only need to meet one prong—either 
the objective or the subjective analysis—in order to prevail on the 
challenged tax benefits.33 Still other circuits use a more flexible 
analysis, which considers the transaction’s tax and non-tax as-
pects, including the taxpayer’s subjective purpose and whether the 
taxpayer had a reasonable expectation that the transaction would 
result in either profit or other economic effects.34 
Regardless of which type of description they use, almost all 
courts that apply the economic substance test have actually ana-
lyzed both the objective and subjective prongs described above.35 
This occurs even in disjunctive-test circuits, where the taxpayer 
technically only needs to win one prong to prevail, and in con-
junctive-test circuits, where the taxpayer’s loss of only one prong 
should technically prevent the tax benefit from being respected.36  
Almost always, the courts have reached the same conclusion 
on both prongs (finding that the transaction either meets both 
the objective and subjective tests, or fails both such analyses).37 
                                                                                                            
32 See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 115; Klamath Strategic 
Investment Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 544 (5th Cir. 2009); Pasternak 
v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993). 
33 See, e.g., Horn v. Comm’r, 968 F.2d 1229, 1234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1992); 
Rice’s Toyota World v. Comm’r, 752 F.2d 89, 91–92 (4th Cir. 1985). 
34 See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. C.I.R., 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998); Sacks v. 
Comm’r, 69 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 1985). 
35 See generally Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 
1144–45 (D. Minn. 2017); see also generally Rosenberg, supra note 2. 
36 See, e.g., IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 355 (8th Cir. 
2001). Similarly, the First Circuit in Santander examined subjective motives, 
even though the opinion said that the circuit prefers to examine only objective 
aspects of the test. See Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844 
F.3d 15, 15, 24 (1st Cir 2016), cert denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4194 (June 26, 2017). 
But see Cherin v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 986, 992 (1987) (declining to reach a finding 
on the taxpayer’s subjective motives after finding that there was no reasonable 
possibility of profit). 
37 See, e.g., IES Industries, 253 F.3d at 353–54 (stating that the Eighth Circuit 
has never had to decide which version of the test it uses because it always 
decides both prongs the same way—yes to both or no to both); Wells Fargo & 
Co., 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1146 (noting that, because the various formulations of the 
economic substance test yield the same result for many fact patterns, some 
circuits may not have needed to choose between the conjunctive, disjunctive, 
and flexible analyses); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States., 143 F. Supp. 3d 
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Therefore, the disjunctive, conjunctive, and flexible versions of the 
test almost always reach the same result.38 In addition, the ob-
jective prong (the profit and economic effect analysis) tends to be 
emphasized, and the business purpose prong (subjective analysis 
of the taxpayer’s motivation) is almost never determinative, regard-
less of the type of economic substance test the court applies.39 
Against this backdrop, Congress enacted section 7701(o), 
as described below.40 It decreases variation among the circuits’ 
descriptions of the economic substance test by requiring a con-
junctive test.41 
B. Brief Overview of Section 7701(o) 
Section 7701(o) provides that “if the economic substance 
doctrine is relevant [to a transaction], such transaction shall be 
treated as having economic substance only if ” it satisfies both an ob-
jective and a subjective prong.42 Thus, the disjunctive version of 
the economic substance test is no longer allowed, and all circuits 
                                                                                                            
827, 834 (D. Minn. 2015) (giving a similar description of the Eighth Circuit’s 
precedents). Another court said that the litigants were unable to cite any case 
in which a court held in the taxpayer’s favor on one prong and against the tax-
payer on the other. Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 
3d 239, 244 (D. Mass. 2015), rev’d, 844 F.3d 15, 26 (1st Cir. 2016). In a recent, rare 
exception, a jury held that a loan had objective profit potential but lacked 
business purpose. See Wells Fargo & Co., 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1142–43; see also 
Wesley Elmore, Jury Sides with Government in Wells Fargo STARS Case, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 18, 2016, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-inter 
national/litigation-and-appeals/jury-sides-government-wells-fargo-stars-case 
/2016/11/21/svb5?highlight=Jury%20Sides%20with%20Government%20in%20 
Wells%20Fargo%20STARS%20Case; Cara Salvatore, Jury Sides with Feds in 
Wells Fargo $76M Tax Credit Suit, LAW360 (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www 
.law360.com/articles/864145/jury-sides-with-feds-in-wells-fargo-76m-tax-credit 
-suit. The court subsequently held that, given those findings, the loan met the 
economic substance test when the court applied the flexible version of that 
test. See Wells Fargo & Co., 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1146. 
38 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
39 Wells Fargo & Co., 260 F. Supp. 3d at 1146. See generally Rosenberg, supra 
note 2 (discussing the pre-codification overlap between the objective and subjec-
tive prongs, as actually applied by the courts). 
40 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 1029, 1067 (2010) (adding I.R.C. § 7701(o) to the Code). 
41 Id. at 124 Stat. 1068. 
42 I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (2012). Relevance is left to the courts to determine. Id. 
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must apply both prongs of the test. (A flexible version of the eco-
nomic substance analysis may still be permissible under section 
7701(o), if taxpayers must satisfy both the objective and the sub-
jective analyses in order to meet such flexible test.)43 
Section 7701(o)’s version of the objective prong requires that 
“the transaction change[] in a meaningful way ... the taxpayer’s 
economic position.”44 Its description of the subjective prong is met 
if “the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal in-
come tax effects) for entering into such transaction.”45 The stat-
ute also imposes a ratio requirement regarding profit potential: the 
“potential for profit … shall be taken into account [for both prongs] 
only if the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax prof-
it is substantial in relation to … expected net tax benefits.”46 
For individuals, section 7701(o) applies only to “transac-
tions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an 
activity engaged in for the production of income.”47 Other trans-
actions of individuals remain subject to the economic substance 
case law (including pre-codification cases), but are not covered by 
section 7701(o). 
Several new penalty provisions relating to the economic sub-
stance doctrine were enacted concurrently with section 7701(o).48 
Under these penalty rules, tax deficiencies attributable to the eco-
nomic substance doctrine (as described in section 7701(o)) are sub-
ject to a twenty percent penalty49 (which rises to forty percent if 
the facts regarding the claimed tax benefit are not adequately 
disclosed on a tax return).50 Tax deficiencies relating to any “similar 
                                                                                                            
43 See Rosenberg, supra note 2 (manuscript at 7) (noting the conjunctive test 
mandated by section 7701(o) does not prevent consideration of other factors in 
addition to the objective and subjective prongs). 
44 § 7701(o)(1)(A). 
45 Id. § 7701(o)(1)(B). 
46 Id. § 7701(o)(2)(A). This Article refers to such rule as the “ratio test” or “profit 
ratio test.” Section 7701(o) also requires the Treasury to issue regulations that 
treat foreign taxes as expenses in computing pre-tax profit “in appropriate 
cases.” Id. § 7701(o)(2)(B). 
47 Id. § 7701(o)(5)(B). 
48 See §§ 6662(b)(6), (c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015). 
49 See § 6662(b)(6) (applying section 6662(a)’s penalty to tax deficiencies 
attributable to the economic substance doctrine or similar doctrines). 
50 See id. § 6662(i)(1)–(2) (regarding failure to adequately disclose on the 
tax return or a statement attached thereto). For a critique of the new penalty 
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rules of law” are subject to the same penalty rules.51 Such penal-
ties (relating to the economic substance doctrine or any similar 
rules of law) cannot be avoided by means of reasonable cause,52 
such as reliance on a tax advisor’s opinion.53 
Because of codification, the Treasury is now able to issue 
regulations and other guidance regarding the economic substance 
doctrine. Such ability stems from Treasury’s generic authority to 
issue guidance with respect to all Code provisions.54 The only 
specific grant of regulatory authority regarding the economic 
substance doctrine is Congress’s mandate that the Treasury issue 
guidance regarding the treatment of foreign taxes in the computa-
tion of pre-tax profit.55 One exception to the Treasury’s regulatory 
abilities in this area is the question of whether the economic sub-
stance doctrine is “relevant” with respect to any particular transac-
tion. That issue remains the exclusive province of the courts.56 
Therefore, the economic substance doctrine is now governed 
partly by statutory terms, partly by case law, and partly (if it 
chooses to issue guidance) by the agency. Under section 7701(o), 
Congress has mandated some of the rules applicable under the 
economic substance doctrine (e.g., the profit ratio test).57 But other 
aspects of the doctrine remain open to interpretation by the courts 
                                                                                                            
provisions, arguing that such increased penalties are unfair, overly harsh, 
and unnecessary, see Thomas, supra note 8, at 465–67. 
51 See id. § 6662(b)(6). 
52 See id. § 6662(b)(6); § 6664(d)(1)–(2) (2015); see also § 6676 (2018) (regarding 
lack of a reasonable basis exception for penalties with respect to excessive 
amounts attributable to the economic substance doctrine or any similar doctrine). 
53 The Joint Committee on Taxation’s description of these penalties includes 
the following language: 
No exceptions (including the reasonable cause rules) to the 
penalty are available. Thus, under the provision, outside opinions 
or in-house analysis would not protect a taxpayer from imposition 
of a penalty if it is determined that the transaction lacks economic 
substance or fails to meet the requirements of any similar rule 
of law. 
STAFF OF THE JT. COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF 
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010, AS AMENDED, 
IN COMBINATION WITH THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
JCX-18-10 (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter JOINT COMM. REP.]. 
54 § 7805(a) (2012). 
55 § 7701(o)(2)(B) (2012). 
56 Id. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
57 Id. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
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(including the meaning of undefined statutory terms, such as 
“substantial”) and by the Treasury (through its regulatory au-
thority).58 The preliminary question of relevance is left to the 
courts,59 as are any other aspects of the doctrine that are neither 
constrained by statutory language nor addressed by agency guid-
ance. The standards and terms contained in section 7701(o) 
should increase the various circuits’ consistency with each other 
as they apply the economic substance doctrine in the future. 
However, each circuit is still able to use its own interpretation of 
terms that the statute leaves undefined, at least until the Treasury 
issues guidance.60  
One of section 7701(o)’s biggest impacts on the judicial 
doctrine of economic substance is the changed balance of power 
it creates between the courts and the agency on this topic.61 Af-
ter codification, the IRS has the ability to impose modifications to 
the economic substance doctrine (except with respect to the pre-
liminary question of relevance).62 However, despite this new ability 
to affect the doctrine and despite recent government victories on 
economic substance issues (under pre-codification case law),63 the 
IRS has shown reluctance to apply the post-codification version 
of the economic substance doctrine.64 The discussion below con-
siders how and why the IRS has communicated this decision, as 
well as the appropriateness of the use of informal guidance to make 
such policy choices.65 
                                                                                                            
58 See §§ 7805(a) (general regulatory authority), § 7701(o)(1)(B) (“substan-
tial”), (2)(A) (“substantial” as part of the ratio test). See generally Rosenberg, 
supra note 2 (discussing the substantive provisions of section 7701(o)). 
59 §§ 7701(o)(1), (5)(C). 
60 See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443(I), at 293 (2010) (describing various circuit’s 
interpretations of the economic substance doctrine before codification); Erik 
M. Jensen, Sometimes Unguided (or Maybe Misguided) Economic Substance 
Guidance, 32 J. TAX’N INV. 27, 39 (2015) (The conjunctive test “requirement 
might not provide for complete consistency among circuit courts, but it is a step 
in the right direction.”). 
61 § 7701(o). 
62 Id. § 7701(o)(1), (5)(C). 
63 See generally  Rebecca Rosenberg, STARS Wars: Application of the Eco-
nomic Substance Doctrine to Foreign Tax Credits, and What the Future Holds, 42 
U. DAYTON L. REV. 165 (2017). 
64 See generally id. 
65 See infra Part II. 
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II. AGENCY INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE: INFORMAL 
 TREASURY GUIDANCE UNDER SECTION 7701(O) 
A. Overview 
So far, the Treasury has issued two notices (and no other 
official guidance) to the public regarding section 7701(o).66 The 
first notice states (among other things) that the IRS will contin-
ue to apply pre-7701(o) case law to interpret section 7701(o), but 
it declines to give the much-requested guidance on “relevance.”67 
The second notice expands (not very helpfully) on the definition 
of the tested “transaction,” and drastically cuts back on the po-
tential application of penalties.68 The IRS has also issued two 
letters to its own employees regarding section 7701(o).69 All four 
documents are largely taxpayer-favorable.70 None was issued un-
der notice and comment procedures.71 These notices and letters, 
and the substantive and authority issues that they raise, are 
discussed further below.72 
B. Two IRS Notices on Economic Substance After Codification 
The two IRS notices regarding section 7701(o) purport to 
provide “guidance” with respect to such Code section, and both 
apply to transactions that occur after March 30, 2010 (which is 
also section 7701(o)’s effective date).73 Notices are a lesser type 
                                                                                                            
66 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
67 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
68 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
69 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); 
I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010) [herein-
after collectively “the directives” or “the IRS directives”]. 
70 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Treas. 
Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); I.R.S. Notice 
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, 
IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010). 
71 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. 
Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); I.R.S. Notice 
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, 
IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010). 
72 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
73 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
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of “guidance” (as compared to regulations)74: they are not subject to 
the notification and comment procedures of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).75 One could therefore question whether it 
is appropriate to use notices to provide rules that are binding on 
taxpayers. Notices are often used to predict that the IRS will issue 
regulations in the future, that such regulations will have content 
described in the notice, and (sometimes) that the regulations’ effec-
tive date will be the notice’s effective date (or soon thereafter).76 
Other notices purport to themselves issue enforceable rules.77 One 
                                                                                                            
74 See, e.g., Stobie Creek Invs. v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 671 (Ct. Cl. 
2008) (“As a general proposition, IRS notices are press releases stating the IRS’s 
position on a particular issue and informing the public of its intentions; such 
notices do not constitute legal authority.... IRS notices are not promulgated 
pursuant to a notice-and-comment period, the process which gives regula-
tions their legal authority and entitles them to Chevron deference.”) (citation 
omitted), aff’d, 608 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Pritired 1, L.L.C. v. United 
States, 816 F. Supp. 2d 693, 728 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (reasoning that “A notice is 
akin to a ‘revenue ruling’ and is an interpretation of the law offered by the 
IRS. While not binding precedent, revenue rulings—and notices—are entitled 
to ‘some weight,’ because the IRS ‘consider[s] them authoritative and bind-
ing.’”) (Citations omitted); In re Wyly, 552 B.R. 338 (U.S. B.R. N.D. TX 2016) 
(“This notice is not entitled to deference under Chevron. This is because the 
IRS Notice has not gone through the notice and comment rulemaking pro-
cess. However, this notice has persuasive weight under Skidmore.”); cf. also 
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(“Revenue rulings receive the lowest degree of deference—at least in this cir-
cuit. In First Chicago, we held that revenue rulings deserve ‘some weight,’ ... 
and are ‘entitled to respectful consideration, but not to the deference that the 
Chevron doctrine requires in its domain,’... In other circuits this question has 
generated inconsistent rulings ranging from Chevron deference to no defer-
ence.”) (citations omitted). 
75 Treasury regulations, even interpretative regulations, are generally is-
sued under notice and comment procedures. See generally Bankers Life, 142 F.3d 
at 978 (stating that the IRS takes the position that notice and comment re-
quirements do not apply to interpretative regulations issued under the general 
regulatory authority of section 7805, but that the IRS nonetheless generally 
follows such procedures for such regulations; notice and comment procedures 
are not followed for revenue rulings, which the IRS views as binding and at 
least some courts see as deserving some level of deference as the agency’s 
interpretation). 
76 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2014-45, 2014-34 I.R.B. 388 (Aug. 18, 2014); I.R.S. 
Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746–47 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 
1998-3 C.B. 52 (Jan. 20, 1998) (withdrawn). 
77 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 90-26, 1990-1 C.B. 336 (Jan. 1990) (purporting to 
withdraw a portion of Temp. Reg. § 1.905-3T (Nov. 7, 2007)); I.R.S. Notice 89-
35, 1989-1 C.B. 675 (Jan. 1989) (purporting to modify Treas. Reg. § 163-8T). 
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could legitimately question whether notices (as an administrative 
vehicle) are legally capable of issuing rules that are binding on tax-
payers, without the issuance of regulations that set forth those 
same rules.78 In other words, one could debate whether notices 
can substitute for regulations, revenue rulings, or revenue proce-
dures, rather than merely forecasting the future issuance of such 
formal types of guidance. 
Notice 2010-62 says that “[t]he IRS will continue to rely 
on relevant case law under the common-law economic substance 
doctrine in applying the two-prong conjunctive test in section 
7701(o)(1).”79 It does not specify that it refers to pre-7701(o) case 
law, and presumably instead means the economic substance case 
law as it evolves over time. But at the moment, more than eight 
years after codification and after the notice’s issuance, there is 
no post-codification case law that interprets section 7701(o). The 
notice thus states the IRS’s intention to use pre-section 7701(o) 
case law to interpret section 7701(o)’s requirements,80 which is 
logically a little odd (unless one assumes that section 7701(o) merely 
summarized the existing conjunctive-test case law). 
The notice further states, more specifically, that it will use 
case law relating to the objective and subjective prongs, respec-
tively, to interpret the two prongs described in section 7701(o).81 
On the one hand, this defers to the judiciary and declines to give 
any guidance on the meaning of the statute’s two prongs. On the 
other hand, it equates the two prongs described in the statute 
with the two prongs previously applied in the pre-codification 
case law (because there is no post-codification economic substance 
case law yet). This seems to overlook the differences between sec-
tion 7701(o)’s versions of the two prongs and the pre-enactment 
versions of the two prongs, as they appear in pre-codification 
case law. (For example, it does not address the statute’s implica-
tion that the objective and subjective prongs cannot now be identi-
cal to each other. Nor does it address differences between section 
                                                                                                            
78 Cf. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 142 F.3d at 978 (discussing the issuance of 
regulations and the lower weight given to lesser types of authority, like reve-
nue rulings). 
79 I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
80 See id. 
81 Id. 
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7701(o)’s phrasing of the two prongs and the usual description of 
such prongs in pre-7701(o) case law.)82 
Taxpayers may argue that the notice83 means that section 
7701(o) should be read as not changing the pre-enactment ver-
sions of the objective and subjective factors (i.e., as exercising 
the IRS’s regulatory authority to provide such an interpretation 
of section 7701(o)). Such a choice by the IRS in Notice 2010-62 
appears to be inadvertent, is arguably more than a mere notice 
could accomplish, and could potentially be subject to a validity 
challenge on the grounds that it conflicts with the statute.84 These 
points may become moot in the future, if and when the courts begin 
to interpret post-codification economic substance doctrine (thus 
removing the issue of whether IRS reliance on pre-codification 
judicial interpretations is valid). The notice also says that the IRS 
will apply a conjunctive test for the economic substance analysis, 
and will challenge any taxpayer effort to apply the disjunctive 
test85 (which is consistent with section 7701(o), although it means 
(for now) pre-codification versions of the conjunctive test). 
The notice further acknowledges that “relevance” of the 
economic substance doctrine (i.e., whether the economic substance 
doctrine can be applied to a transaction) is left to the courts.86 
The relevance issue is specifically reserved to the courts by the 
statute, which states that relevance determination “shall be made 
in the same manner as if this subsection had never been enacted.”87 
Consistent with this reservation of the relevance issue to the 
courts, the notice states that the IRS will continue to analyze 
relevance by examining the case law, just as it did before codifi-
cation.88 The notice also acknowledges that the IRS expects the 
                                                                                                            
82 See generally Rosenberg, supra note 2 (describing changes that section 
7701(o) makes to the economic substance doctrine). 
83 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
84 However, as discussed further below, taxpayers are unlikely to challenge 
any IRS guidance that is taxpayer-favorable. See infra notes 202–03 and text 
accompanying. 
85 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
86 See id.; see also I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (2012). The issue of whether the doc-
trine applies is merely the gateway question of whether the IRS or the courts 
should complete the economic substance analysis. Even if the analysis is con-
ducted, the transaction might still meet—or instead fail—the economic substance 
test. See id. § 7701(o)(1). 
87 Id. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
88 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
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case law regarding relevance to “continue to develop.”89 Lastly, 
the notice confirms that “the Treasury Department and the IRS 
do not intend to issue general administrative guidance regarding 
the types of transactions to which the economic substance doc-
trine either does or does not apply.”90  
Taxpayers have asked the IRS to issue guidance on when the 
economic substance doctrine is relevant.91 Sometimes taxpayers 
have requested either a list of transactions to which the econom-
ic substance doctrine does apply, or (instead) an “angel list” or 
“white list” of transactions to which the doctrine never applies.92 
The IRS’s decision not to issue guidance on relevance is contrary 
to taxpayer requests, but is consistent with the Treasury’s lack 
of regulatory authority on this issue.93 
                                                                                                            
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 412. 
91 See, e.g., Michael J. Desmond et al., Firms Seek Codified Economic Sub-
stance Doctrine Guidance, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 2, 2015, https://www.taxnotes 
.com/tax-notes-today/penalties/firms-seek-codified-economic-substance-doctrine 
-guidance/2015/02/04/fq0y?highlight=Desmond (“[W]e recommend that Treasury 
and the IRS issue substantive guidance on which taxpayers and practitioners 
can rely regarding whether the economic substance doctrine is ‘relevant’ to a 
transaction.”); see also Peter H. Blessing, NYSBA Tax Section Recommends 
More Guidance on Codification of Economic Substance Doctrine, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Jan. 5, 2011, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/corporate 
-taxation/nysba-tax-section-recommends-more-guidance-codification-economic 
-substance-doctrine/2011/01/07/vq8c (asking the IRS to “enunciate a few prin-
ciples identifying broad categories of transactions to which the [doctrine] is 
not ‘relevant’”). 
92 See, e.g., Blessing, supra note 91, at 7. 
93 Notice 2010-62 further states that the IRS will not issue private letter 
rulings or determination letters regarding either relevance or whether a particu-
lar transaction meets the economic substance test. I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 
I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). Later, in Notice 2014-58, the IRS said that “[w]hether the 
economic substance doctrine is relevant ... will be considered on a case-by-
case basis, depending on the facts and circumstances of each individual case.” 
I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). Because the IRS has 
admitted that it does not have regulatory authority to provide guidance on rele-
vance, the quoted language presumably refers to the IRS’s analysis of whether it 
can raise economic substance as an issue (e.g., at the audit level or in litiga-
tion), not whether it should issue binding guidance. Id. A court would then be 
free to disagree with the IRS’s determination of whether the economic substance 
doctrine applied to a particular transaction or not (i.e., whether a particular type 
of tax benefit was exempt from the doctrine). 
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On a different issue, Notice 2010-62 also states that the 
IRS and the Treasury “intend to issue regulations” regarding the 
circumstances in which foreign taxes are treated as a cost in com-
puting profit (for purposes of applying the economic substance 
doctrine).94 Such issuance would comply with section 7701(o)’s 
mandate that the Treasury issue guidance on this topic.95 Despite 
the notice’s 2010 statement, no agency guidance has yet been issued 
on this subject. 
Section 7701(o) provides that profit potential is taken into 
account for the two prongs of the economic substance analysis 
only if reasonably expected profit is substantial as compared to 
expected tax benefits (determined as if the transaction were re-
spected).96 Notice 2010-62 says that the IRS plans to follow this 
rule.97 However, it describes the rule as relating to whether 
“profit motive” is taken into account, rather than “potential for 
profit.”98 The use of the word “motive” is puzzling, but the IRS does 
not appear to mean that the ratio test applies only for purposes 
of determining subjective intent. (Nor would such an interpretation 
necessarily be a valid reading of the statute.) The IRS applies its 
“profit motive” limitation to both prongs (“[i]n determining whether 
the requirements of section 7701(o)(1)(A) and (B) are met”), which 
implies that “profit motive” may be intended to mean “reasonably 
expected profit.”99 
                                                                                                            
94 I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
95 See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(2)(B) (2012). 
96 See id. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
97 I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
98 Compare id. with § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
99 I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). In addition, the 
IRS “will apply existing relevant case law and other published guidance” to 
implement the ratio test, according to the notice. It is not clear what this 
“existing ... guidance” might be (other than the two notices themselves), given 
that there is no other published administrative guidance to date (other than 
the internal IRS letters, discussed below) and no court case has yet interpreted 
section 7701(o)’s ratio test. The phrasing of the ratio test described in the statute 
(e.g., the use of the word “substantial”) differs from the pre-codification case 
law’s comparisons of expected profit and expected tax benefits, although it 
resembles the wording of (withdrawn) Notice 98-5 (which predicted the issu-
ance of certain regulations regarding foreign tax credits). See § 7701(o)(2)(A); 
I.R.S. Notice 98-5, 1998-3 C.B. 49 (Jan. 20, 1998) (withdrawn); Knetsch v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 361, 365–66 (1960) (holding that expected profit that was “a 
relative pittance” was not enough); Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 
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The notice also provides further guidance on how to meet 
the disclosure requirements of some of the amendments that 
accompanied section 7701(o).100 In addition, it states that the 
IRS is particularly interested in taxpayer comments regarding 
such disclosure mechanics.101 
Issued four years later, Notice 2014-58 focuses on the def-
inition of the “transaction” to be tested under the economic sub-
stance doctrine and the interpretation of “similar rule of law” (which 
is relevant for the penalty provisions enacted concurrently with 
section 7701(o)).102 
Regarding the delineation of the tested transaction, No-
tice 2014-58 does not add much.103 It essentially says that the 
tested transaction is determined based on the facts and circum-
stances. It adds that the primary consideration is whether par-
ticular steps were “tax-motivated steps that are not necessary to 
accomplish the non-tax goals.”104 These types of steps “may” be 
treated as one transaction, with remaining steps tested sepa-
rately (as a different transaction).105  
The notice begins by providing a default definition of a 
testable transaction. A “‘transaction’ generally includes all the 
                                                                                                            
932, 951, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1366 (2016) (finding that 
profit “grossly disproportionate to the tax benefits” was not enough); WFC 
Holdings Corp. v. U.S., 728 F.3d 736, 746 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that “mod-
est profits” compared to “substantial tax benefits” were insufficient) (citation 
omitted); Sheldon v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 738, 767–68 (1990) (finding that profit 
that was “infinitesimally nominal and vastly insignificant when considered in 
comparison with the claimed deductions” was not sufficient). See generally 
Rosenberg, supra note 2 (discussing differences between the ratio test and pre-
codification case law, and similarities between the ratio test and Notice 98-5). 
100 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
101 See id. 
102 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
103 Cf. Amy S. Elliott, IRS Ruling Was First Under New Significant Issue 
Policy, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 17, 2014, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes 
/corporate-taxation/irs-ruling-was-first-under-new-significant-issue-policy/2014 
/10/20/qxcm (reporting on public comments by then–Associate Chief Counsel 
(Corporate) William Alexander: Notice 2014-58 was “‘merely rearticulating what 
the Service has said all along,’ he said. Sowell asked why the government felt the 
need to issue the guidance now. Alexander said he didn’t know, reiterating that 
he didn’t think the IRS said anything in the notice that it hadn’t said before”). 
104 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
105 See id. 
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factual elements relevant to the expected tax treatment ... and any 
or all steps that are carried out as part of a plan.”106 The first 
phrase of that definition is similar to the case law, although 
“relevant to” the claimed tax benefit is a little broader than the 
common case law formulation of steps “necessary” to achieve the 
tax benefit.107 The second phrase quoted above (“any or all steps”) 
seems to require a facts and circumstances analysis to define the 
“plan,” but does not specifically state that “relev[ance] to the ex-
pected tax treatment” is the standard to be applied. The defini-
tion quoted above is adapted by the IRS from a regulation issued 
in the “analogous context of reportable transactions.”108  
The notice then says that the default rule described above 
“may” be changed—and steps may be aggregated or disaggre-
gated in order to determine the transaction to be tested—if there 
is a “tax motivated step that is not necessary to achieve a non-
tax objective.”109 In that case, the tested transaction “may” con-
sist only of such steps.110 This part of the IRS’s discussion is 
phrased a little differently than some courts’ formulations: sev-
eral courts have said that the tested transaction consists of the 
steps necessary to claim the challenged tax benefit.111 The notice, 
in contrast, says that steps that are both insufficiently connected 
to non-tax utility (rather than those affirmatively necessary for 
                                                                                                            
106 Id. (emphasis added). 
107 See, e.g., Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 543, 585 (Fed. 
Cl. 2013) (“the links between the Trust and Loan components of STARS are 
artificial, and further, ... the disputed foreign tax credits are attributable solely 
to the Trust. Accordingly, the Court will bifurcate the STARS transaction and 
examine the Trust structure for economic substance, independent of the Loan,” 
although the court also analyzed the transaction without bifurcating the loan 
and trust), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 786 F. 3d 932 (Fed Cir. 2015), and cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1366 (2016); Bank of New York Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 
801 F.3d 104, 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2015) (focusing on the transaction that gener-
ated the disputed tax benefit), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1377 (2016); ACM P’ship 
v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 262 (3d Cir. 1998) (allowing deductions for losses 
that were “separate and distinct” from the tax benefits that were the main 
point of the challenged transaction), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999). 
108 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014) (referring to 
the definition of “transaction” in Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(1), which relates to 
disclosure requirements for reportable transactions described in section 6011). 
109 Id. 
110 See id. 
111 See supra text accompanying note 107. 
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a tax benefit, as described in the case law) and also “tax moti-
vated” are separated from other steps of the taxpayer.112 
The IRS’s language regarding whether various steps are 
“necessary to achieve a non-tax objective” resembles the language 
of the tax court in ACM v. Commissioner.113 That particular phras-
ing was part of that court’s description of the economic substance 
test, but this wording is sometimes cited as a description of the sub-
jective prong.114 (The ACM court did not apply either a conjunctive 
or disjunctive format, but instead described the economic sub-
stance test as a more flexible analysis, including consideration of 
both profit potential and subjective motive.)115 Notice 2014-58 
essentially adapts the ACM court’s description of transactions that 
meet the economic substance test (i.e., of what the economic sub-
stance test is seeking to determine, and what will allow a trans-
action to pass the test) and uses that phrasing to separate steps 
that seem to have more business content from other, tax-benefit-
focused steps.116 In other words, the notice uses the tax court’s 
phrasing (or, more specifically, language that resembles such phras-
ing) for a different purpose than the tax court did.  
Using the word “may”117 is consistent with the notice’s later 
emphasis that “whether a transaction should be disaggregated will 
                                                                                                            
112 This test appears to require that taxpayers meet only one of the two 
stated criteria: steps meeting either the non-tax-motivated or necessary-to-a 
non-tax-objective standards may be respected as part of a larger whole and not 
re-characterized as separable from the rest of the transaction. Steps failing 
only one of such two criteria do not appear to necessarily be treated as sepa-
rable from the rest of the transaction. However, the notice qualifies its default 
test by stating that facts and circumstances analyses may be applied. See I.R.S. 
Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
113 See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 22157 (Mar. 5, 1997) 
(“Key to this determination is that the transaction must be rationally related 
to a useful nontax purpose that is plausible in light of the taxpayer’s conduct 
and useful in light of the taxpayer’s economic situation and intentions.”). 
114 See, e.g., Compaq v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2001); Austin v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2017-69, 11 (2017); Salina Partnership L.P. v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2000-352, 13 (2000); H.R. REP. NO. 111-443 at 297 (2010). 
115 See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]hese dis-
tinct aspects of the economic sham inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of 
a ‘rigid two-step analysis,’ but rather represent related factors both of which 
inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient substance, apart 
from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes.”). 
116 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
117 If there is a “tax motivated step that is not necessary to achieve a non-tax 
objective,” then the tested transaction “may” consist only of such steps. See id. 
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be considered on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts and 
circumstances of each individual case.”118 The notice avoids giv-
ing clear, mechanical rules, opting instead for weighing and balanc-
ing of all of the facts and circumstances.119 
Notice 2014-58 also addresses the meaning of “similar 
rule of law.”120 That term is important because tax deficiencies 
attributable to “similar rules of law” are subject to the same en-
hanced penalty provisions as tax deficiencies arising under sec-
tion 7701(o).121 Notice 2014-58 states that no Code or regulatory 
provision will be treated as such a “similar rule of law” (except sec-
tion 7701(o) itself, and regulations issued thereunder).122 That 
leaves only judicial doctrines as potential “similar rules of law.” 
The notice explains that a “similar rule of law” is one “that 
applies the same factors and analysis” as section 7701(o),123 “even 
if a different term” is used to describe such rule of law or doctrine.124 
It lists “step transaction” and “substance over form” as doctrines 
that are not “similar rules of law.”125 However, the notice gives 
“sham transaction doctrine” as an example of such a “different 
term.”126 This implies (without directly stating) that the sham 
                                                                                                            
118 Id. 
119 See id. 
120 Id. 
121 See I.R.C § 6662(b)(6), (c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015). 
122 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct.27, 2014). 
123 The notice adapts this terminology from the House Report’s description 
of circumstances in which the enhanced penalties would apply. See H.R. REP. 
NO. 111-443, at 304 (2010); Thomas C. Vanik, Jr., Torpedoing a Transaction: 
Economic Substance Versus Other Doctrines and the Application of the Strict 
Liability Penalty, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 109, 117 n.65 (2015) (pointing out that 
this language in Notice 2014-58 mirrors language in the House Committee re-
port: “The notice relied on the legislative history, which states that the ‘penalty 
would apply to a transaction that is disregarded as a result of the application 
of the same factors and analysis that is required under the provision [section 
7701(o)] for an economic substance analysis, even if a different term is used 
to describe the doctrine’”). 
124 The notice also defines “similar rule of law” as meaning a doctrine that 
disallows tax benefits because a transaction fails either the objective or sub-
jective prong (as described in section 7701(o)). This is the equivalent of section 
7701(o)’s conjunctive test, despite the use of the word “or” rather than “and”: 
a transaction meets the economic substance test if it passes both prongs, and 
fails the test if it fails either prong (i.e., if it fails the objective or the subjec-
tive prong). See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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transaction doctrine is a “similar rule of law” for purposes of 
section 6662(b)(6) and the other relevant penalty provisions.127 
Despite that implication, the notice literally only treats 
“sham transaction doctrine” as a “similar rule of law” if the IRS (or 
a court) treats the sham transaction doctrine as applying “the 
same factors and analysis” as section 7701(o).128 If a court used 
the term “sham transaction doctrine” to mean a different theory 
or analysis (as compared to economic substance), such application 
by the court presumably would not be treated as a similar doc-
trine.129 For example, the case law has distinguished between 
“factual shams” (in which the claimed steps did not actually occur) 
and “economic shams” (in which the steps did occur, but did not 
fall within Congressional intent for generating a particular type 
of tax benefit).130 Thus, “sham transaction,” if used to refer to a 
factual sham, might not be similar to the economic substance 
doctrine. The whole point of the notice’s approach is that the 
term used to describe a doctrine is not determinative—the ques-
tion (for deciding if there is a “similar rule of law”) is whether 
the factors and analysis described in section 7701(o) are used.131 
There is an argument that any doctrine that uses the same 
factors that are described in section 7701(o) would fall within 
the definition of the “economic substance doctrine”132 in section 
                                                                                                            
127 See id. 
128 See id. 
129 Cf. William R. Davis, Economic Substance Notice Not Intended to Implicate 





public comments by Treasury official (Tax Legislative Counsel), Thomas West, 
who said that the notice does not mean that the sham transaction doctrine 
will always be treated as a similar doctrine to economic substance, and that 
he was surprised that practitioners read the notice that way, without giving a 
detailed explanation of what exactly the notice’s wording does mean). 
130 See infra note 310 and accompanying text. 
131 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
132 See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) (2012) (defining the economic substance doctrine 
as “the common law doctrine under which tax benefits under subtitle A ... are not 
allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business 
purpose”). For example, the disjunctive test falls within the statute’s definition of 
the economic substance doctrine. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-43, at 297 n.128. If a court 
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7701(o). If that is the case, the notice effectively states that no 
judicial doctrine (that was not already subject to section 7701(o) 
and treated as the “economic substance doctrine” for purposes of 
that section) would be treated as a “similar rule of law.” Because 
the notice also excludes statutory and regulatory rules from be-
ing “similar rules of law” for this purpose,133 “similar rules of law” 
would be a null set (other than section 7701(o) itself). Under that 
interpretation, the notice has made “similar rule of law” moot 
and meaningless. Query whether defining “similar rule of law” 
as a null set is within, or instead beyond, Treasury’s regulatory 
authority (on the grounds that such an interpretation may be in-
consistent with the statute, and that interpretations that render 
statutory language moot are generally disfavored).134 
Alternatively, taxpayers might argue that no judicial anti-
abuse rules use the same factors as section 7701(o) because sec-
tion 7701(o)’s descriptions of the two prongs differ from the case 
law definitions.135 (They could cite, for example, the requirement 
for “substantial” business purpose, as well as the profit ratio test 
that applies for both prongs.)136 Such an argument also leads to 
no doctrines being treated as “similar rules of law,” under the 
notice’s rules. We can expect that the IRS and taxpayers may 
vigorously debate the meaning of “same factors and analysis [as 
section 7701(o)].”137 
                                                                                                            
defined the sham transaction doctrine as having two prongs that are equiva-
lent to section 7701(o)’s prongs, the so-defined sham transaction doctrine appears 
to fall within section 7701(o)’s definition of the economic substance doctrine. 
133 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
134 See, e.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“A statute should be 
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant”); Bailey v. United States, 
516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) (“We assume that Congress used two terms because 
it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”); Gus-
tafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 577–78 (1995);  Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 
U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (“give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 
statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legis-
lature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed”). 
135 See § 7701(o); see also Rosenberg, supra note 2 (discussing differences 
between section 7701(o) and the pre-codification case law). 
136 See §§ 7701(o)(1)(B), (2)(A). See generally Rosenberg, supra note 2 (dis-
cussing new rules enacted by section 7701(o), as compared to pre-enactment 
case law). 
137 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014).  
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The courts are not bound by the notice’s rule about similar 
doctrines. That rule, by its terms, applies only to predict whether 
the IRS will argue that a doctrine is a “similar rule of law.”138 The 
notice does not provide authoritative guidance in the same way 
as a regulation.139 
The notice also narrows the potential range of arguments 
that the IRS could treat as “similar rules of law” in another 
manner: the notice states that no tax deficiency will be treated 
as attributable to a “similar rule of law” unless the IRS also 
raises section 7701(o).140 In other words, if the IRS does not as-
sert section 7701(o), then it will not argue that any other author-
ities it relies on are “similar rules of law” for purposes of the 
penalty provisions.141 
The notice also narrows the potential range of arguments 
that the IRS could treat as “similar rules of law” in another 
manner: the notice states that no tax deficiency will be treated as 
attributable to a “similar rule of law” unless the IRS also raises 
section 7701(o).142 In other words, if the IRS does not assert sec-
tion 7701(o), then it will not argue that any other authorities it 
relies on are “similar rules of law” for purposes of the penalty 
provisions.143 There appears to be a validity issue with respect to 
that choice also, on the grounds that the IRS’s decision disregards 
(and renders moot) the statutory requirement that the penalty 
amendments enacted with section 7701(o) apply both to section 
7701(o) and to “similar rules of law.”144 If the IRS will never 
argue that there is a “similar rule of law” unless it raises section 
7701(o), then the inclusion of “similar rules of law” in the penalty 
provisions is meaningless (because the penalty never applies unless 
section 7701(o) is raised, so the reference to the economic sub-
stance doctrine is sufficient, without more).145 Also query whether 
                                                                                                            
138 See id. 
139 See id.; Understanding IRS Guidance—A Brief Primer, IRS (May 9, 2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer [https:// 
perma.cc/R9MH-DVE6]. 
140 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
144 See §§ 6662(b)(6), 6662(c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015). 
145 Assume, however, that the IRS raised section 7701(o) in litigation with 
respect to a particular transaction, and also asserted three other judicial anti-
abuse doctrines (other than economic substance). Further assume that the court 
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a court could conclude that a tax deficiency is attributable to a 
“similar rule of law” (triggering the same penalties that would 
apply if section 7701(o) were the basis of a deficiency), even if 
the IRS does not raise that argument.146 
Viewed as a whole, the notice provides that the IRS will 
not argue that a tax deficiency is attributable to a “similar rule of 
law” for purposes of the penalty provisions unless a) such rule of 
law is a judicial doctrine, b) that doctrine uses the same factors 
and analysis as section 7701(o), and c) the IRS also raises section 
7701(o).147 If one takes the notice at face value, one could say that 
the required three factors considerably narrow the potential scope 
of “similar rules of law” (possibly to zero), but also provide more 
predictability for taxpayers regarding the application of the strict 
liability penalties associated with economic substance issues.148 
One could further note that the notice’s guidance on this topic ap-
pears to require a case-by-case analysis, rather than giving a list of 
doctrines that always are or always are not “similar rules of law.”149 
Looking at the IRS’s asserted three factors logically, how-
ever, the notice appears to be saying that there are no “similar 
rules of law,” other than judicial doctrines that are identical to 
(redundant with) section 7701(o) but are called by another name 
and are raised where the IRS is already raising section 7701(o). 
This makes no sense—the notice is literally saying that the IRS 
will never assert that any doctrine is a “similar rule of law” unless 
                                                                                                            
held for the government under one of those other three doctrines. In that case, 
the IRS might treat such other doctrine as a similar rule of law (for purposes 
of the penalty provisions), but only if such doctrine used the same factors and 
analysis as section 7701(o). The step transaction doctrine, for example, is not 
treated as a “similar” doctrine under Notice 2014-58. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-
58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). The IRS likely would not assess the 
enhanced penalties for deficiencies relating to the step transaction doctrine 
even though it had attempted to use the economic substance doctrine against 
the same transaction. Theoretically, however, there might be another doctrine 
that uses the same factors as section 7701(o), even if the relevant circuit refers 
to that doctrine by another name, for example if the court refers to such other 
rules as the “economic sham doctrine.” Is such a fact pattern sufficient to stop the 
phrase “similar other doctrine” from becoming moot under the notice’s approach? 
146 Presumably, the IRS could prevent such a conclusion by formally con-
ceding (in a particular case) that its arguments are not “similar rules of law.” 
147 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
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that doctrine is completely duplicative of the IRS’s other argument 
(section 7701(o)) in the same case. This interpretation appears to 
read the “similar rule of law” language out of the statutory frame-
work and is arguably an instance of the agency publicly com-
municating that it will not implement language (“similar rule of 
law”) enacted by Congress. 
1. Two IRS Directives Discourage Agents from Raising  
Economic Substance Issues 
The IRS has also issued two directives to its own examiners 
regarding section 7701(o) (the codified version of the economic 
substance doctrine).150 The first directive, issued in 2010, was 
addressed as “examination guidance” to employees of the former 
Large and Mid-Sized Business (LMSB) Division.151 Its substantive 
guidance consisted of one sentence: “To ensure consistent ad-
ministration of the accuracy-related penalty imposed under sec-
tion 6662(b)(6)” on tax deficiencies that occur by reason of the 
economic substance doctrine or any similar rule of law, “any pro-
posal to impose a section 6662(b)(6) penalty at the examination 
level must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate Direc-
tor of Field Operations before the penalty is proposed.”152 
The IRS (at least the former LMSB Division) was thus fo-
cused on the penalties associated with the economic substance 
doctrine (and imposed by reason of the penalty amendments that 
accompanied section 7701(o)). The directive’s requirement that rais-
ing such penalties must first be approved by a Director of Field 
Operations is clearly a barrier to asserting such penalties: it 
imposes another procedural layer (which is a disincentive for IRS 
examiners) and raises the possibility that the Field Director could 
say no. Because the penalties are a mandatory consequence of any 
tax deficiency attributable to section 7701(o) (or any similar rule 
of law), the additional approval requirement presumably also dis-
suaded examiners from raising economic substance (and similar 
                                                                                                            
150 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); 
see also I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010). 
151 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 
2010). 
152 See id. 
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issues), not just the penalties. This IRS policy presumably reduces 
the intended deterrent effect (and revenue-raising potential) of 
the enhanced penalties that were enacted with section 7701(o). 
The IRS later expanded its internal guidance on section 
7701(o) by issuing another directive, this time addressed to the 
newly formed Large Business and International (LB&I) Divi-
sion.153 This second directive “instruct[ed] examiners and their 
managers how to determine when it is appropriate to seek the 
approval of the DFO (Director of Field Operations) in order to raise 
the economic substance doctrine.”154 It also provided procedures 
for the examiner to follow in order to seek such approval, which 
included submitting a written analysis of thirty-five specified 
factors.155 These paperwork requirements created hurdles that 
must have been meant to (and likely did) dissuade examiners 
from raising the economic substance doctrine. 
The directive also provided that, “until further guidance is 
issued,” no rule or doctrine would be treated as a “similar rule of 
law” for purposes of penalty assertion.156 In particular, the sham 
transaction doctrine, step transaction doctrine, and substance over 
form doctrine would not be so treated.157 The agency (or part 
thereof) appeared to be declining to implement particular statu-
tory language (relating to penalty provisions enacted with respect 
tax deficiencies attributable to “similar rules of law”).158 As de-
scribed above, this part of the directive is now obsolete, because 
further guidance has been issued: Notice 2014-58 defines “simi-
lar rule of law” (ruling out the step transaction and substance over 
form doctrines, and including the sham transaction doctrine, but 
only where the latter uses the same analysis as section 7701(o) 
and the IRS raises section 7701(o)).159 
The directive also states that generally “a series of inter-
connected steps with a common objective” is one “transaction” for 
purposes of applying the economic substance doctrine.160 It “may 
be appropriate” to treat as a separate transaction “tax-motivated 
                                                                                                            
153 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. 
158 See I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(6), (c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015). 
159 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
160 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
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steps that bear only a minor or incidental relationship to a sin-
gle common business or financial transaction.”161 But in order to 
bifurcate steps “with a common objective,” an examiner “is re-
quired to seek guidance from their manager and consult with their 
local counsel.”162 
The directive requires an examiner to complete four steps 
before seeking approval to raise the economic substance doctrine.163 
First, the examiner must consider a series of eighteen listed factors 
that would indicate that it is “likely not appropriate” to raise the 
doctrine.164 Those factors include whether the tax benefit at issue 
is consistent with legislative intent.165 They also ask whether 
the “[t]ransaction creates meaningful economic change on a pre-
sent value basis (pre-tax)” and whether it “has credible business 
purpose apart from federal tax benefits.”166 These two factors 
resemble section 7701(o)’s two main requirements, except that the 
directive does not ask if the business purpose is “substantial,” as 
required by section 7701(o).167 
The directive also specifically states that “it is likely not 
appropriate” to assert the doctrine in four specific instances: the 
choice between debt and equity, the choice of a foreign rather 
than a U.S. entity to make a foreign investment, “[t]he choice to 
enter into a ... corporate organization or reorganization under 
subchapter C,” or “[t]he choice to utilize a related-party entity in 
a transaction, provided that arm’s length standard of section 482 
and other applicable concepts are satisfied.”168 These four instances 
mirror the legislative history’s list of circumstances in which sec-
tion 7701(o) is generally not expected to change the tax result.169 
                                                                                                            
161 See id. 
162 See id. 
163 See id. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
166 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
167 See id.; see also I.R.C. § 7701 (2012). 
168 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
169 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-43, at 296 (2010) (“The provision is not intended 
to alter the tax treatment of certain basic business transactions that, under 
longstanding judicial and administrative practice are respected, merely because 
the choice between meaningful economic alternatives is largely or entirely based 
on comparative tax advantages.”); see also JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 53 
(giving same four non-exclusive examples of basic business conduct for which 
section 7701(o) was not intended to alter the tax treatment). Immediately 
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Next, the examiner must consider a second list of seven-
teen factors that conversely indicate that the application of the 
economic substance doctrine “may be appropriate.”170 These sev-
enteen factors are generally just the reverse of each of the eighteen 
factors described above (except for the factor regarding Congres-
sional intent, which does not appear in the reverse in the second 
list).171 It is not clear why both (mostly duplicative) lists are neces-
sary, rather than one being sufficient. 
This second list asks whether the “transaction has no credi-
ble business purpose,” again not examining whether such purpose 
is “substantial.”172 Nor does either list of factors apply the profit 
ratio test imposed by section 7701(o)(2)(A).173 It is particularly 
striking that although section 7701(o) lists two factors (the ob-
jective and subjective prongs), the directive lists eighteen (if one 
counts each of the duplicative factors only once).174 Under these 
lists, merely failing the two prongs (as modified by the directive to 
omit both the ratio test and the requirement that business purpose 
be substantial) is not enough to show that the economic substance 
doctrine should be raised as an issue (much less that the transac-
tion lacks economic substance).175 Instead (before the economic 
                                                                                                            
after the four examples, the House and Joint Committee Reports both state that 
“[l]easing transactions, like all other types of transactions, will continue to be 
analyzed in light of all the facts and circumstances.” H.R. REP. NO. 111-43, at 
296; JOINT COMM. REP., supra note 53, at 153. It is not totally clear whether 
this indicates that the four examples will not be examined in accordance with 
all of their facts and circumstances (which seems an odd interpretation), or 
whether instead the four examples are included within the “all other transac-
tions” that (like leasing transactions) will be so examined. See H.R. REP. NO. 
111-43, at 296. The latter interpretation is bolstered by the immediately follow-
ing confirmation that “the fact that a transaction does meet the requirements 
for specific treatment under any provision of the Code is not determinative of 
whether a transaction or series of transactions of which it is a part has eco-
nomic substance.” Id. Also, under section 7701(o), the issue of whether the doc-
trine applies (i.e., the type of transaction or tax benefit to which it applies) is 
ultimately left to the courts. See § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
170 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 
2011) (emphasis added). 
171 See id. 
172 See id. 
173 See § 7701(o)(5)(A). 
174 See § 7701(o)(1); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 
20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
175 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
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substance doctrine can be raised), multiple other factors also need 
to be taken into account (without any indication of relative weight), 
and then the examiner must perform the additional two steps of the 
process and the DFO must approve the assertion of the issue.176 
Thirdly, the examiner must address a list of seven “inquir-
ies.”177 Each inquiry describes circumstances in which the eco-
nomic substance doctrine “should” not be applied (rather than de-
finitively saying that it cannot be applied).178 In particular, inquiry 
five says that the doctrine should not be applied if another judi-
cial doctrine is more appropriate.179 In other words, the economic 
substance doctrine should not be applied in addition to another 
doctrine (if the other doctrine is more appropriate), even if the 
economic substance doctrine is also a viable argument.180 This 
appears aimed at preventing the use of the enhanced penalties 
associated with economic substance. Inquiry seven asks whether 
the economic substance doctrine is “among the strongest argu-
ments available.”181 If not, the doctrine “should” not be applied 
“without specific approval of the examiner’s manager in consul-
tation with local counsel.”182 
Lastly, after completion of the above steps, the examiner 
must describe the above analysis in writing, “in consultation 
with his or her manager and territory manager” in order to seek 
DFO approval of raising economic substance arguments.183 That 
written analysis is then submitted to the DFO, who should “con-
sult with Counsel before a decision is made.”184 
In addition, an examiner is required to notify the taxpayer 
that the examiner is considering raising the economic substance 
doctrine (as soon as possible, and not later than the time the 
examiner begins the required pre-DFO-approval analysis of fac-
tors).185 Before granting approval to raise the economic substance 
                                                                                                            
176 See id. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. 
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doctrine, the DFO “should” give the taxpayer an opportunity to 
respond in writing or in person.186 
Neither of the above directives are irrevocable for the IRS 
(which can change its mind at any time), nor may either di-
rective technically be relied on by taxpayers.187 Each directive 
states that it is “not an official pronouncement of law, and can-
not be used, cited, or relied upon as such.”188 However, because 
such directives are publicly available and because they help pre-
dict the enforcement choices of the IRS, taxpayers treat them as 
if they were official guidance.189 Further, the directives provide 
mandatory guidance for IRS examiners and other IRS employees, 
unless and until such directives are modified.190 
The second directive requires an examiner to consider much 
more than whether a transaction fails one of section 7701(o)’s 
two prongs.191 One could argue that the directive effectively re-
quires a variant of the flexible version of the economic substance 
test, rather than the conjunctive (meeting two prongs is sufficient) 
or disjunctive (meeting one prong is enough) test. The directive does 
not specify how many factors must be met (or failed) before the 
economic substance doctrine is raised (or before raising the eco-
nomic substance argument is determined to be inappropriate).192 
Presumably, examiners can also consider additional fac-
tors (as well as the eighteen listed in the directive), as long as 
they consider the listed items. In other words, the lists are not 
necessarily the exclusive factors, although the directive does not 
address that point.193 
                                                                                                            
186 See id. 
187 See id.; see also I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 
(Sept. 14, 2010). 
188 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); 
I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010). 
189 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 16 (reporting that practitioners treated No-
tice 2014-58 as if it reversed actual guidance created by the second directive, 
and as if that directive had previously provided rules that taxpayers could rely 
on: “Practitioners are ... faulting the notice for its reversal of course on a prior 
IRS directive that exempted the sham transaction doctrine from being consid-
ered a ‘similar rule of law.’”) (emphasis added). 
190 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); 
I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010). 
191 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
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All of the required analyses and consultation, followed by 
written description of the analyses and seeking approval of the 
examiner’s manager and DFO, create disincentives for examiners 
to raise the economic substance doctrine.194 
These numerous obstacles (many analyses, multiple approv-
als, and a written report of the analyses), before an LB&I examiner 
is even allowed to assert the economic substance doctrine,195 raise 
questions about the appropriate limits of an agency’s enforcement 
discretion. If anyone had standing, could one argue that the IRS 
has essentially chosen to almost never enforce section 7701(o),196 
despite Congress’s clear statement (in section 7701(o)) that the 
courts are the final determiners of whether the doctrine applies?197 
Could one argue that such nonenforcement goes beyond the 
agency’s authority? Or does the agency always have discretion not 
to raise a judicial doctrine as a legal argument? Has codification 
altered the extent of such allowable discretion? Might the IRS 
argue that because the directives are not technically binding guid-
ance, therefore such directives need not follow any rules that might 
require an agency to more closely adhere to Congressional intent? 
The second directive’s thirty-five factors (eighteen, if du-
plicative ones are disregarded) can also be read as creating stand-
ards for treating certain transactions as meeting the economic 
substance test (in practice).198 A transaction for which the eco-
nomic substance test is not raised is effectively treated as if it 
meets the economic substance analysis. 
Under the statute, transactions must meet at least the two 
prongs in order to pass the economic substance analysis.199 But 
                                                                                                            
194 See Sheppard, supra note 5 (arguing that the LB&I directive creates hurdles 
that discourage IRS employees from raising the economic substance doctrine). 
195 In contrast, Chief Counsel review (by an Associate office or the office of 
the Taxpayer Advocate) is required for section 7701(o) cases only if the fact pat-
tern is “novel.” See CC-2016-009 (June 30, 2016), Exhibit 35.11.1-1, Part II, 
Procedure and Administration issue 22 (Chief Counsel Notice that preceded 
expected changes to the Chief Counsel Directives Manual) (“The application of 
the codified economic substance doctrine under section 7701(o) in novel cases.”). 
196 See Sheppard, supra note 5 (criticizing the second directive). 
197 See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (2012). 
198 Alternatively (or in addition), the IRS directive can be viewed as de-
termining relevance (in practice), which is outside the IRS’s authority under the 
statute. See § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
199 See § 7701(o)(1). 
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the directive requires analysis of far more than just variants of the 
objective and subjective prongs set forth in the statute, before the 
doctrine can be raised.200 The directive thus can be read as chang-
ing the statutory minimum (in effect): even transactions that fail 
the code’s objective and subjective prongs are safe from having the 
economic substance doctrine raised if they meet some (unspecified) 
combination of the directive’s eighteen (or thirty-five) factors. 
That is the directive’s practical result, although the directive 
technically governs examiners’ behavior in raising the doctrine 
rather than literally setting forth a test (or safe harbor) for meet-
ing the doctrine. A transaction can fail one or both prongs (which 
would cause failure under the newly required conjunctive test or 
under former versions of the disjunctive test, respectively) and 
still be exempt from an economic substance analysis under the 
directive’s factors (although such factors are vague). 
Because the IRS has created a policy under which a trans-
action must fail more than just one of the two prongs before such 
transaction is treated as lacking economic substance, that stand-
ard (more taxpayer favorable than the conjunctive test) appears 
questionable under the statutory language. Now that Congress 
has mandated the conjunctive test (meaning that taxpayers must 
meet both prongs, and that failing even one prong is sufficient to 
fail the economic substance test),201 how can the directive require 
that eighteen factors be analyzed before the doctrine is even raised? 
For that reason, the directive is arguably an invalid exercise of 
administrative discretion (because it appears to allow a transac-
tion that fails one or both prongs to nonetheless avoid the economic 
substance analysis, thereby de facto being respected as having 
economic substance). 
But the extent of the IRS’s authority only matters if any tax-
payer (or other member of the public) has standing202 to challenge 
                                                                                                            
200 Compare I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 
2011) (eighteen factors and multiple steps), with § 7701(o)(1) (requiring application 
of the subjective and objective prongs). 
201 See § 7701(o)(1). 
202 See Ryan Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Griev-
ances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1885–86 
(1996) (describing the judicial principle that a “generalized grievance,” suffered 
by a large group of citizens, cannot supply standing); Nancy Staudt, Taxpayers in 
Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY 
L.J. 771, 782, 832, 842 (2003) (agreeing that it is difficult for taxpayers to 
achieve standing on the basis of a generalized grievance regarding federal tax 
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it and wishes to do so. This is unlikely, because taxpayers are 
generally not prone to challenge the validity of anything that 
makes the IRS less likely to apply the economic substance doctrine, 
especially given the high penalties that are now associated with 
the doctrine.203 
The two directives appear to largely survive the later is-
suance of Notice 2014-58,204 with one exception. The notice’s rules 
                                                                                                            
issues, attempting to find a pattern in federal courts’ treatment of such standing 
issues, and contrasting the (more taxpayer-favorable) treatment of generalized 
grievance standing issues regarding state and local taxes, even in the federal 
courts); Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of 
the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829, 847 (2012) (considering whether third parties, 
not the subject of potential IRS enforcement actions, have standing to challenge 
the IRS’s lack of action); cf. Daniel Jacob Hemel & David Kamin, The False 
Promise of Presidential Indexation, 36 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming) (manu-
script at 25, 28?32), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=318 
4051 (discussing the difficulty of achieving standing to challenge potential IRS 
regulations that index the bases of capital assets, and suggesting that states 
might have such standing if the states’ income tax is computed by reference 
to the federal income tax calculation). But see Patrick J. Smith, Standing Issues 





%20to%20Tax%20Regulations (arguing that a taxpayer need not suffer a direct 
injury in order to have standing to challenge the validity of an IRS regulation). 
See generally Mark Gabel, Note, Generalized Grievances and Judicial Discretion, 
58 HASTINGS L.J. 1331 (2007) (discussing the generalized grievance doctrine 
and its evolution over time). It is not clear whether the standing requirement 
with respect to agency inaction might be different than the criteria for stand-
ing to challenge the validity of a Treasury regulation, because the former is a 
failure to act, while the latter is an active publication of a rule. Conceivably, 
the IRS’s communication of its unwillingness to assert the economic substance 
doctrine, through its internal letters to its own employees, could be viewed as 
an action (rather than inaction). There would remain, however, the issue of 
whether any specific taxpayer suffered identifiable, particularized harm, rather 
than a generalized grievance shared with a large class of taxpayers or citizens, 
as a result of the IRS’s decision not to apply the economic substance doctrine (or 
to apply it only rarely). 
203 See § 6662(b)(6) (2018) (imposing a strict liability penalty for tax defi-
ciencies attributable to lack of economic substance (as defined under section 
7701(o))). See also §§ 6662(c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015). 
204 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); Andrew 
Velarde, ABA Section of Taxation Meeting: ‘Wait-and-See’ Approach for More 
Economic Substance Guidance, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 9, 2015, https://www 
.taxnotes.com/tax-notes/penalties/aba-section-taxation-meeting-wait-and-see 
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regarding similar rules of law appear to override the second 
directive’s statement that no doctrine will be treated as similar 
rule of law until further guidance is issued.205 Notice 2014-58 ap-
pears to constitute such further guidance.206 In other respects, 
the directives survive as rules for IRS employees. Although these 
are technically internal directives within the IRS, they are availa-
ble to the public, and taxpayers read and rely on them as if they 
were intended as taxpayer guidance.207 
III. AGENCY RESPONSE TO AND CERTAIN BIGGER PICTURE ISSUES 
RAISED BY SECTION 7701(O) 
A.  Issues Regarding the Agency 
1. Interaction Between the Three Branches of Federal  
Government 
Section 7701(o)208 raises some interesting issues about the 
interaction between the three branches of the Federal government. 
First, it presents a rare instance of the legislative branch writing 
                                                                                                            
-approach-more-economic-substance-guidance/2015/02/09/qy3v?highlight=Ap 
proach%20for%20More%20Economic%20Substance%20Guidance (“Rochelle 
Hodes, attorney-adviser, Treasury Office of Tax Legislative Counsel [speaking at 
an American Bar Association meeting in 2015] ... said that Notice 2014-58, 2014-
44 IRB 746, released in October 2014, in no way overrules previous IRS Large 
Business and International Division directives from 2010 (LMSB-04-0910 -024) 
and 2011 (LB&I-04-0711-015), which still serve as guidance to examiners and 
managers.”). 
205 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. 
Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
206 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. 
Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
207 See Rosenberg, supra note 2; see also Marie Sapirie, Increase in Informal 




ance%20Unlikely%20to%20Stop%20Soon (“‘As a practical matter, if a position 
is taken in an industry directive, for all intents and purposes I think a taxpayer 
can in practice rely on that,’ said Roland Barral, area counsel (financial services 
industry), IRS Large Business and International Division;” some practitioners 
expressed reluctance to rely on the second economic substance directive due to 
concerns about the application of penalties to “similar rules of law,” but that was 
before Notice 2014-58 laid such concerns to rest). 
208 See § 7701(o) (2012) (codifying the judicial doctrine of economic substance). 
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rules about the substance of a court-developed doctrine of inter-
pretation in the tax area—not a procedural rule about what 
kinds of evidence are admissible,209 or what the standard of proof 
should be, but the content of a judicial rule for respecting tax bene-
fits. This appears to be an unusual level of involvement by the 
legislative branch regarding a set of substantive rules developed 
by the courts, except that the whole point of the economic sub-
stance doctrine is to implement Congressional intent.210 Therefore, 
perhaps it is logical for Congress to tell the judiciary how it 
wishes its own intent to be tested. Even if logical, this is an atypi-
cal example of Congress altering a broad judicial rule that applies 
generally to many tax benefits, rather than Congress correcting 
the judiciary’s interpretation of one specific statutory provision.211 
Further, section 7701(o) includes Congressional delegation of regu-
latory authority to the Treasury.  This allows the agency (the IRS) 
to mandate changes (for the first time) to a long-standing judicial 
doctrine, by means of issuing guidance under section 7701(o).212  
2. Agency Authority to Issue Guidance 
a. Grant of Regulatory Authority 
The biggest impact of section 7701(o) may be that it grants 
the Treasury the authority to issue guidance that changes, expands, 
                                                                                                            
209 See, e.g., § 6110(j)(3) (2007) (indicating that non-binding IRS rulings are 
not admissible in court); Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-7(b) (1988) (indicating that “a 
written determination may not be used or cited as precedent ….”). 
210 See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Bank of N.Y. Mellon 
Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that the economic 
substance doctrine is meant to implement Congressional intent). 
211 See, e.g., § 901(i) (2010). There has been some dispute in the past as to 
whether Treasury regulations can override a pre-existing judicial interpreta-
tion of a statute. For example, the “Mexican Railroad cases” held that Treasury 
regulations could not have that effect. See Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 497 
F.2d 1386, 204 Ct. Cl. 837 (1974); Chi., Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. United 
States, 455 F.2d 993 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev’d on other grounds, 412 U.S. 401 (1973); 
Mo.-Ill. R.R. Co. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1001 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Mo. Pac. R.R. 
Co. v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff’d in part and rev’d 
in part on other grounds, 411 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1969). See generally Rev. Rul. 
78-256; G.C.M. 37264 (1977). In that instance, Congress solved the dispute be-
tween the courts and the agency by enacting a new statutory provision, section 
901(i), that reflected the challenged regulations’ rules. See § 901(i). 
212 See §§ 7701(o), 7805(a) (2012). 
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or constrains the judicial anti-abuse doctrine of economic substance 
(by issuing guidance under section 7701(o)).213 Section 7701(o) has 
thus shifted the balance of power in the development of the eco-
nomic substance doctrine away from the courts and towards the 
Treasury—but only if the Treasury chooses to exercise its regu-
latory authority. 
The scope of the Treasury’s regulatory authority regarding 
economic substance varies depending on the particular sub-issue.214 
Section 7701(o) contains specific regulatory authority (a mandate, 
actually) only with respect to the treatment of foreign taxes as a 
cost in computing profit (“in appropriate cases”).215 In contrast, 
Congress specifically reserved the relevance determination to the 
courts, depriving Treasury of the ability to issue guidance on that 
topic.216 But for all other aspects of section 7701(o) (with the 
possible exception of the definition of the tested transaction),217 the 
Treasury has general regulatory authority under section 7805.218 
It therefore can presumably issue guidance regarding any word-
ing or concepts contained in section 7701(o) (with the exceptions 
discussed above). For example, the Treasury clearly has authority 
to issue guidance on what constitutes “meaningful” change in eco-
nomic position, for purposes of the objective prong.219 Potential-
ly, such guidance could even be retroactive if it is characterized 
as an anti-abuse rule (because anti-abuse rules are an exception 
                                                                                                            
213 See § 7805(a) (granting the Treasury the authority to issue “rules and 
regulations for the enforcement of this title”). 
214 Compare § 7701(o)(2)(B) (“The Secretary shall issue regulations requiring 
foreign taxes to be treated as expenses in determining pre-tax profit in appropriate 
cases”), with id. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (“The determination of whether the economic sub-
stance doctrine is relevant to a transaction shall be made in the same manner 
as if this subsection had never been enacted ….”). 
215 § 7701(o)(2)(B). 
216 Id. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
217 The definition of the tested “transaction” is not explicitly reserved to the 
courts, in contrast to the relevance issue. Compare § 7701(o)(5)(D) (addressing 
transactions), with id. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (discussing relevance). But the statute’s 
description of the “transaction” is consistent with case law, and the legislative 
history states that the statute was not intended to change the courts’ ability to 
aggregate and disaggregate steps or actions in order to define which steps or ac-
tions should be tested together as one transaction. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, 
at 296–97 (2010). See generally Rosenberg, supra note 2. 
218 See § 7805(a). 
219 See § 7701(o)(1)(A). 
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from the general requirement that Treasury guidance must be 
prospective only).220 But the agency has so far chosen to issue 
only two notices, and two internal letters to its own employees, 
on the subject of section 7701(o).221 
If granting regulatory authority is one of the most important 
aspects of section 7701(o), but the IRS has not used its guidance 
authority to do much, other than with respect to penalties and 
reporting requirements (mostly just saying that it will follow pre-
section-7701(o) case law on other issues)—then how much has 
section 7701(o) done, really? Even if there has not been much 
substantive guidance on section 7701(o) so far, the Treasury has 
the ability to issue additional guidance about the economic sub-
stance doctrine in the future.222 Also, section 7701(o) contains sev-
eral mandatory rules (e.g., the profit ratio rule and the requirement 
for “substantial” non-tax purpose that does not duplicate the 
objective prong) that apply even without Treasury guidance.223 
The lack of extensive guidance (more than eight years af-
ter section 7701(o)’s enactment) raises an additional question.224 
The IRS has the authority to issue guidance on the economic 
substance doctrine and has shown itself willing to litigate eco-
nomic substance issues under pre-section-7701(o) case law.225 If 
the agency is willing to take positions on the interpretation of the 
economic substance doctrine in litigation, why has not it issued 
                                                                                                            
220 See § 7805(b)(3). 
221 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, 
IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 
20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
222 See § 7805(a). 
223 See §§ 7701(o)(1)(B), (o)(2)(A). See generally Rosenberg, supra note 2. 
224 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, 
IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 
20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
225 See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 104, 107, 125 
(2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. 136 S. Ct. 1375 (2016); Salem Fin., Inc. v. 
United States, 786 F.3d 932, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1366 
(2016); Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 844 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4194 (June 26, 2017); Wells Fargo & Co. 
v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1440 (D. Minn. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 
17-3578, No. 17-3676 (8th Cir. Nov. 24, 2017). 
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guidance? Guidance presumably would be more efficient than liti-
gating: more likely to succeed in implementing the IRS’s view, less 
expensive for the U.S. government in general (in terms of collecting 
tax revenue, as balanced against the costs of litigation or of issu-
ing guidance), and faster and more efficient (in terms of total time 
expired and person hours consumed). It would, for example, sig-
nificantly lessen the government’s risk of losing future economic 
substance litigation (for cases addressing transactions that occur 
after section 7701(o)’s effective date), because the IRS could write 
government-favorable rules. To be fair, the economic substance 
cases that the government has litigated so far are pre-section-
7701(o) transactions, and would not have been affected by guid-
ance issued under section 7701(o).226 For those cases, therefore, the 
government did not have a choice between litigating or issuing 
guidance, because the IRS had no regulatory authority with respect 
to the economic substance doctrine for the time periods at issue. 
But issuing guidance could prevent future litigation or improve 
the government’s odds of winning future cases. Section 7701(o)’s 
effective date has applied for years now, so cases applying that 
section should be arriving in the courts soon (if the IRS chooses 
to raise the issue). 
b. Informal Guidance Issued by the IRS 
The Treasury has issued two notices on section 7701(o) so 
far.227 Other than discussing the penalty provisions applicable to 
section 7701(o) deficiencies, the notices mostly just say that the 
IRS will continue to follow conjunctive-test economic substance case 
law (which currently consists solely of pre-section-7701(o) case 
law).228 For example, the notices say that the IRS will continue 
to apply existing case law to determine if the transaction meets 
the two prongs described in 7701(o).229 This fails to acknowledge 
                                                                                                            
226 See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 801 F.3d at 107, 125; Salem Fin., Inc., 
786 F.3d at 951; Santander Holdings USA, Inc., 844 F.3d 15; Wells Fargo & Co., 
260 F. Supp. 3d at 1140. 
227 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
228 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. No-
tice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
229 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). The IRS says 
that it will apply the statute’s profit ratio test for both prongs, as a prerequisite 
 
240 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:199 
that section 7701(o)’s descriptions of the two prongs might differ 
from the descriptions in pre-7701(o) case law.230 In particular, it 
does not address the definition of “meaningful” change in the objec-
tive prong or the “substantial” standard in the profit ratio test.231 
It also does not admit that, under section 7701(o), it might not 
be possible to meet the business purpose requirement solely by a 
showing of potential profit (or by otherwise duplicating the ob-
jective prong).232 
However, practically speaking, continuing to use pre-7701(o) 
case law to define the objective and subjective prongs (even after 
section 7701(o) takes effect) is a taxpayer-favorable position,233 
and therefore unlikely to face a challenge from taxpayers. How-
ever, courts might disagree with the IRS’s interpretation of the two 
prongs sua sponte, in theory.234 It is also theoretically possible that 
the Department of Justice (DOJ), litigating on behalf of the U.S. 
government, might take a different litigating position about the 
meaning of the two prongs than the IRS has taken in its notices.235 
                                                                                                            
before “profit motive” can be taken into account. But it also says that “[i]n 
performing this calculation, the IRS will apply existing relevant case law and 
other published guidance.” Presumably, the IRS does not mean that it will use 
the “de minimis” or “insignificant” profit descriptors of pre-7701(o) case law to 
interpret the statute’s profit ratio test. See supra note 99 and accompanying 
text (citing Sheldon and other cases). Such an interpretation of the section 
7701(o) prongs would seem vulnerable to a validity challenge, if any taxpayer 
had standing and chose to question the rule. Practically speaking, though, 
the agency has more leeway on validity concerns whenever the guidance at 
issue favors taxpayers.
230 See Rosenberg, supra note 2 (manuscript at 49) (discussing the impact 
of codification on the business purpose prong). 
231 See I.R.C. §§ 7701(o)(1)(A), (2)(A) (2012); I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 
I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
232 See Rosenberg, supra note 2. 
233 See id. 
234 See generally Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference: Judi-
cial Independence in Informal Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006). 
235 The IRS represents the government in the Tax Court. In all other courts 
(including the Court of Claims, the District Courts, and all appellate courts), 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) represents the U.S. government. The taxpayer 
can choose which court will hear its tax case: the Tax Court, the Court of Claims, 
or the applicable District Court. Therefore, practically speaking, the taxpayer 
can choose to litigate against the IRS rather than DOJ, or vice versa. One addi-
tional factor is that taxpayers need not pay the disputed tax before challenging 
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The notices, because they are informal vehicles, are not binding 
on the courts236 or on the Department of Justice. Technically, 
literally, they are not binding on taxpayers—they only set forth 
the IRS’s policy on how it will interpret section 7701(o).237 The 
notices are not a vehicle that requires deference from the courts 
(unlike, for example, regulations that are issued after notice and 
comment procedures). These notices thus leave the courts (and 
taxpayers) able to argue for their own interpretation of the stat-
utory language. But the notices are likely to be good predictors 
of the IRS’s litigation positions, and its positions on audit with 
respect to the economic substance doctrine.238 
The other substantive issue addressed in the notices is the 
idea that “rules of law” (which, like economic substance issues, 
trigger mandatory penalties) are limited to judicial doctrines that 
use the same factors and analysis as section 7701(o), and that are 
asserted in cases where the IRS is also raising section 7701(o).239 
In other words, the IRS will not enforce the statutory require-
ment regarding penalties for “similar rules of law.”240 
With respect to administrative guidance, the focus (by both 
the Treasury and taxpayers) appears to have been on the penalty 
consequences of section 7701(o) issues, rather than the substan-
tive impact of section 7701(o) on the economic substance doctrine.241 
                                                                                                            
that tax in the Tax Court, while payment of the tax is required before a case is 
brought in a District Court or the Court of Claims. 
236 See supra text accompanying note 87. Cf. William Funk, Administrative 
Law Discussion Forum: Legislating for Nonlegislative Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1023 (2004) (suggesting that legislation could address the level of judicial defer-
ence that should be given to various types of administrative guidance); Todd 
Rakoff, The Choice between Formal and Informal Modes of Agency Guidance, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 159 (2000) (discussing the Food and Drug Administration’s in-
creasing use of informal methods of communicating guidance to the public). 
237 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
238 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
239 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014). 
240 See discussion supra at Section II.B; see also notes 132–47 and accom-
panying text. 
241 Cf. Richard M. Lipton, “Codification” of the Economic Substance Doctrine—
Much Ado About Nothing, 112 J. TAX’N 325, 329 (2010) (“In many respects, 
the most important aspect of the new legislation is not the substantive law 
concerning the definition of economic substance but rather the penalty that is 
imposed on transactions that lack economic substance.”). 
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There appears to have been less emphasis on the rules for de-
termining whether a transaction lacks economic substance (and 
whether section 7701(o) has changed those rules) and more at-
tention on the increased penalties caused by other statutory 
changes that accompanied section 7701(o). The notices discuss 
(and perhaps received the most attention for) the situations to 
which the enhanced penalties will apply.242 
The IRS has also issued two internal letters (or directives) 
to its own employees regarding the application of the economic sub-
stance doctrine.243 The second letter requires examiners to con-
sider eighteen factors, to complete a written report, and to obtain 
approval from multiple levels of managers before asserting the 
economic substance doctrine.244 These requirements appear likely 
to deter IRS employees (at least those in the Large Business and 
International (LB&I) division) from raising the issue.245 The moti-
vation for these internal procedural hurdles appears again to be 
IRS reluctance to impose the enhanced penalties associated with 
the economic substance doctrine. 
The IRS’s issuance of instructions to its own examiners 
raises issues about the interaction between such informal IRS direc-
tives and the IRS’s regulatory authority. Taxpayers read the former 
for guidance,246 although technically it is not binding on the courts, 
can be changed at will by the IRS, is not addressed to taxpayers, 
and cannot be relied on by taxpayers.247 In particular, one could 
debate the appropriateness of the IRS using this type of directive 
                                                                                                            
242 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Notice 
2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). Similarly, the internal IRS guidance 
seems intended to avoid imposing such enhanced penalties. See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. 
LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010). 
243 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 
2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
244 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
245 See Sheppard, supra note 5 (arguing that the LB&I directive discourage 
IRS employees from raising the economic substance doctrine). 
246 See Rosenberg, supra note 2; supra text accompanying note 208; see also, 
e.g., Jensen, supra note 61, at 38 (implying that the 2011 directive had the same 
weight of authority as Notice 2014-58 and noting that “some commentators have 
complained that [the notice’s reference to the sham transaction doctrine] … 
contradicts guidance provided by the Service not so long ago [meaning the 
2011 internal IRS directive].”). 
247 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
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as a means to narrow the impact of (or contradict the clear man-
date of) statutory language, in a manner that the Treasury could 
not accomplish by formal guidance248 (because it does not have 
regulatory authority to either define relevance, alter the statutory 
mandate for strict liability penalties, or respect as having economic 
substance a transaction that fails either of the two prongs listed 
in section 7701(o)).249  
The IRS’s directives arguably present an instance of an 
agency thwarting Congressional intent via internal guidance to 
its employees (which also impacts taxpayer behavior, because the 
guidance is publicly available). Yet no one is likely to challenge 
the agency’s authority to limit the application of section 7701(o), 
because such limits are generally taxpayer favorable (because the 
consequences of applying the economic substance doctrine may 
often be harsher—especially when penalties are taken into ac-
count—than the use of other rules available to the agency).250 
The IRS has thus arguably accomplished an end run around 
its lack of regulatory authority regarding “relevance.”251 (Tax-
payers indeed had asked the IRS to provide guidance on relevance, 
                                                                                                            
248 Cf. American Air Liquide, Inc. v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 23, 27 (2001) (holding 
that the executive branch cannot frustrate Congressional intent by declining 
to issue regulations to provide a rule called for by a statute); Int’l Multifoods 
Corp. v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 25, 38 (1997). If the executive branch cannot, by passive 
inaction, prevent legislation from taking effect, how can affirmative executive 
action (not formal guidance but written directives to employees) appropriately 
have that same impact of preventing a statutorily envisioned rule from taking 
effect? One could argue that the IRS is merely exercising its enforcement discre-
tion, or that section 7701(o) does not require that the economic substance doctrine 
be used (but merely sets parameters that apply if and when the doctrine is raised). 
249 See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2018); id. §§ 7701(o)(1), (o)(5)(c) (2012); see also 
Jensen, supra note 60, at 31–32. 
250 If a transaction lacks economic substance, it is disregarded for federal 
income tax purposes, which is harsher than the result under many other anti-
abuse rules. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also Rosenberg, supra 
note 63, at 169 n.12. However, sometimes the economic substance doctrine pro-
duces a countervailing benefit for the taxpayer, because it causes all tax ef-
fects of a transaction to be disregarded (including taxpayer-unfavorable effects 
like income inclusions). But the increased penalties currently associated with 
failing the economic substance doctrine are likely to exceed any taxpayer ad-
vantage from disregarding an income inclusion, even if such benefit was not 
already outweighed by the taxpayer’s loss of the originally claimed tax bene-
fit (such as an interest deduction or foreign tax credit). 
251 See § 7701(o)(5)(c). 
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despite such lack of authority.)252 So far, none of the Treasury’s 
written pronouncements regarding section 7701(o) (two notices and 
two letters to IRS employees) are binding (non-reversable) on the 
IRS as an institution,253 nor can they technically be relied on by 
taxpayers. Nor are courts bound to follow the notices or the di-
rectives.254 But taxpayers react to both such notices and such let-
ters as if these communications from the IRS can be relied on.255 
Because the notices256 and (especially) the internal IRS 
directives are informal types of “guidance,” there is no formal no-
tice and comment procedure for them, and the Treasury appears 
to believe that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does not 
apply to such vehicles.257 Also, because the notices and letters are 
not technically binding on the IRS or on taxpayers, and might not 
literally constitute “guidance,” their validity as a permissible exer-
cise of agency power seems harder to challenge as a procedural mat-
ter. Nor is there an obvious avenue for objecting to the content of 
the notices or letters, because they are informal. Conversely, how-
ever, the notices and letters function as—i.e., are respected by both 
taxpayers and the IRS as if they were—official, binding guidance.258 
The IRS’s written instructions to its examiners, essentially 
ordering them not to raise the economic substance issue unless it 
is the only (or the best) option, and requiring many procedural hur-
dles before examiners can raise the doctrine in any circumstances, 
                                                                                                            
252 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
253 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
The letters to LB&I employees may be binding on such employees, but the IRS 
(following its own institutional processes) can change or ignore the content of 
such letters any time it chooses to do so. 
254 See Pritired 1, LLC v. United States, 816 F. Supp. 2d 693, 728 (S.D. Iowa 
2011) (“A notice is akin to a ‘revenue ruling’ and is an interpretation of the law 
offered by the IRS. While not binding precedent, revenue rulings—and notices—
are entitled to ‘some weight,’ because the IRS ‘consider[s] them authoritative 
and binding.’”) (citations omitted). 
255 See supra text accompanying notes 247–48. 
256 See Pritired 1, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (stating that IRS notices should be 
given “some weight,” on the theory that they are similar to revenue rulings). 
257 See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 978 (7th 
Cir. 1998). See generally Book, supra note 17, at 547–51 (discussing the man-
ner in which the IRS issues informal guidance). 
258 See supra text accompanying notes 206–08. 
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arguably circumvent the will of Congress.259 For example, if a 
claimed tax benefit could be challenged under both the step trans-
action doctrine and the economic substance doctrine, and the IRS 
uses only the former grounds (decreasing its chances of prevailing 
in court, and preventing the application of the enhanced penalties 
associated the section 7701(o)), does that raise issues regarding 
the acceptable limits of agency discretion?  
If the IRS attempts to discourage agents from raising eco-
nomic substance issues (perhaps even when it is the only or best 
argument), does that choice by the agency arguably violate sepa-
ration of powers principles by effectively repealing legislation (by 
refusing to apply it)? Where is the line between invalid frustra-
tion of Congressional intent by the agency, on the one hand, and 
valid exercise of agency discretion, on the other (e.g., if the agency 
does not have the resources to follow through on everything re-
quired by the statute)?260 Are enforcement priorities more allowable 
                                                                                                            
259 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
260 See generally NINA E. OLSON, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 2017, at vii (Dec. 31, 2017) (“Funding cuts have rendered 
the IRS unable to provide acceptable levels of taxpayer service, unable to up-
grade its technology to improve its efficiency and effectiveness, and unable to 
maintain compliance programs that promote both compliance and protect 
taxpayer rights.”); John A. Koskinen, Woodworth Lecture: The Challenges 
Facing the IRS of the Future, 159 TAX NOTES 1163 (May 21, 2018) (discussing 
funding, resources, and staffing challenges faced by the IRS). 
The “Brand X doctrine,” regarding the courts’ application of Chevron def-
erence, doesn’t appear to apply to IRS choices to enforce or not enforce the econom-
ic substance doctrine, e.g., on the theory that the IRS is declining to follow 
case law precedent interpreting the statute. The Brand X doctrine holds that: 
“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds 
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus 
leaves no room for agency interpretation.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). See generally Hemel & 
Kamin, supra note 202 (manuscript at 18). The Brand X doctrine appears to apply 
where a court has interpreted a statute, and then an agency issues a contrary 
interpretation of the same statute. So far, at least, no court has interpreted 
section 7701(o)—the economic substance statute—as compared to pre-section 
7701(o) judicial applications of the doctrine. There is therefore no prior judi-
cial interpretation of section 7701(o) (currently) with which the IRS statements 
about section 7701(o) can conflict (unless one argues that section 7701(o) incorpo-
rates prior case law by reference). One could also argue that the IRS decision 
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in the form of unwritten practices than as written communications 
(even informal guidance) to the public? The IRS (like any agency) 
understandably has enforcement priorities, and makes choices 
about the use of enforcement resources. But the IRS’s approach 
to the economic substance doctrine is a little unusual because it 
involves apparent reluctance to apply an entire doctrine (an 
entire legal argument)—in almost any circumstances—rather than 
a decision not to apply a particular statute or legal principle in 
specific, narrow fact circumstances.261 
Are these issues ameliorated because IRS examiners can 
raise economic substance arguments, if they meet the required 
internal procedural hurdles and receive permission as required by 
the LB&I letter? Asserting such economic substance arguments is 
therefore not prohibited outright, even if the paperwork and ap-
proval requirements turn out to have the same effect, in practice. 
One could potentially argue that the IRS’s disinclination to 
raise economic substance issues does not constitute lack of enforce-
ment of the statute, and is not mean the IRS is disregarding the 
statute. Rather, one could say, the statute neither creates nor 
                                                                                                            
to deter enforcement of the economic substance doctrine does not involve the 
“construction” or interpretation of a statute, but rather the choice of whether 
to enforce or apply the statute at all. 
261 For example, the IRS has previously issued informal guidance (addressed 
to the public) indicating that it will not contest foreign tax credit creditability 
claims for specific foreign taxes, that it will not assert that frequent flyer miles 
earned during business travel constitute income (in specific circumstances), and 
that it will not argue that fans’ catching of baseballs during baseball games is 
income (in particular circumstances). See Ann. 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 621 (frequent 
flyer miles); I.R.-98-56 (IRS News Release regarding baseballs); Notice 2008-3, 
2008-1 C.B. 253 (stating that the IRS will not contest creditability of the Mexican 
“IETU” tax). But all of these address narrow fact patterns, rather than pub-
licly stating a disinterest in asserting an entire legal theory (with the possible 
exception of egregious transactions, although the second directive’s procedural 
hurdles apply in all circumstances). 
These examples also consist of communications that were officially addressed 
to the public, unlike the internal IRS directives, which were addressed to IRS 
employees. See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 
2011); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010). It 
doesn’t seem logical that the IRS should have more enforcement discretion if 
it uses informal communication with taxpayers (e.g., communication not di-
rectly addressed to taxpayers at all) compared to official, formal guidance (such 
as regulations). 
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requires the use of the economic substance doctrine, but instead 
merely provides that if the IRS or the courts choose to use the eco-
nomic substance doctrine, then the doctrine’s content must follow 
the requirements of section 7701(o). Under this interpretation, 
the IRS is free to ignore section 7701(o) unless and until it de-
cides to raise economic substance issues in particular taxpayer 
cases, at which time its economic substance arguments must 
comply with section 7701(o)’s rules. But Congress unambiguously 
intended to strengthen the economic substance doctrine, and meant 
for the doctrine to continue to be used where appropriate.262 
Although the IRS can decide when to raise economic substance 
issues (and could also make such choices before the doctrine was 
codified), the de facto decision that the doctrine should never be 
raised (or almost never) seems contrary to Congress’s intent in 
enacting section 7701(o). 
Practically speaking, any authority issues regarding the 
Treasury’s ability to take the approaches described in the notices 
and the internal IRS directives (including any issues regarding the 
agency’s role under separation of powers principles) only have an 
impact if someone challenges those pieces of informal guidance.263 
Taxpayers who benefit from an IRS position do not generally 
challenge the IRS’s authority regarding such taxpayer-favorable 
guidance (for obvious reasons).264 It is not clear whether any other 
                                                                                                            
262 H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (2010). 
263 Cf., e.g., Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 114 (2015) (discussing tax-
payer’s challenge to the validity of an IRS regulation), rev’d, 2018 WL 
3542989 (9th Cir. 2018). 
264 One could imagine, however, circumstances (not commonly occurring, but 
possible) in which taxpayers might want to challenge the validity of the notices 
or the internal IRS directives and their content. (In that case, the issue might 
be whether such a person technically has standing to raise such challenge, and 
in what venue.) For example, assume the following facts: Buyer Corp buys busi-
ness Z from Seller Corp. The sales contract provides that if the IRS imposes 
additional tax or interest after the sale with respect to transactions of business 
Z that occurred in years before the sale, Seller Corp must reimburse Buyer for 
such taxes and interest (as well as legal fees and any penalties), but only if 
penalties are imposed. If no penalties are imposed, Seller Corp is not required 
to reimburse Buyer Corp for any of such amounts (including additional tax or 
interest). Assume that the IRS raises an issue on audit regarding a pre-sale year of 
business Z. Buyer Corp wants Seller Corp to be responsible for any additional 
amounts that the IRS collects by reason of such issue (for the pre-sale year). The 
dollar amounts are large. The IRS asserts another ground, rather than section 
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person (anyone not directly affected by the informal guidance) has 
standing to bring such a challenge.265 Essentially, the agency can 
issue any content it likes through informal guidance, as long as 
there is no fact pattern in which a taxpayer or other person would 
a) want to, b) have standing to, and c) have a procedural mecha-
nism to challenge the Treasury’s authority to do so.266 A taxpayer 
who did meet those criteria might challenge the informal guid-
ance267 on the grounds that a) it may be invalid because it may 
be inconsistent with section 7701(o) and with Congressional intent 
regarding that statute and its associated penalties, or b) if it func-
tions (and is treated in every way except admissibility in court) 
as if it were a regulation (as if it were formal guidance), then it 
must follow administrative law procedures that apply to regula-
tions (such as notice and comment procedures). 
3. IRS Deterred from Raising Economic Substance Issues 
Congress seems to have accomplished, in some ways, the 
opposite of what it intended to achieve with section 7701(o).268 
                                                                                                            
7701(o) or economic substance, and does not attempt to collect penalties. Buyer 
Corp now is motivated to try to get the IRS to raise section 7701(o) and to assert 
strict liability penalties. 
265 See Zelenak, supra note 202, at 847 (considering whether third parties, not 
the subject of potential IRS enforcement actions, have standing to challenge the 
IRS’s lack of action). See generally Staudt, supra note 202, at 782 (agreeing that 
it is difficult for taxpayers to achieve standing on the basis of a generalized griev-
ance regarding federal tax issues, attempting to find a pattern in federal courts’ 
treatment of such standing issues, and contrasting the (more taxpayer-favorable) 
treatment of generalized grievance standing issues regarding state and local 
taxes, even in the federal courts). See supra text accompanying note 201. 
266 See generally Zelenak, supra note 202 (discussing pro-taxpayer IRS deci-
sions not to enforce statutory rules in certain fact patterns, considering that the 
IRS has less leeway, practically speaking, to act in taxpayer-unfavorable ways, 
and discussing standing to challenge taxpayer-favorable agency actions). 
267 I.R.S. Notice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. 
LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 
2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20-0910-024, IRM 
20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010). 
268 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (2010) (expressing Congressional in-
tent to make the economic substance doctrine more effective); Sheppard, supra 
note 5 (arguing that the IRS has essentially stopped enforcing the economic 
substance doctrine). 
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Counterintuitively, strict liability penalties associated with eco-
nomic substance issues (and enacted at the same time as section 
7701(o)) may prevent or substantially lessen the application of the 
economic substance doctrine in practice, by discouraging the IRS 
from raising the issue.269 The IRS’s instructions to its employees 
make it less likely that such IRS employees will raise economic 
substance issues, because such instructions require consideration of 
eighteen factors, completion of a written report, and approval from 
multiple levels of managers.270 The IRS’s expressed aversion to 
raising economic substance issues appears to be caused not by 
section 7701(o) itself, but by the accompanying amendments to 
various penalty provisions.271 Those amendments imposed twen-
ty percent and forty percent penalties, without reasonable basis 
exceptions, for deficiencies asserted under the economic sub-
stance doctrine (as defined in section 7701(o)).272 The two notices 
published with regard to section 7701(o), like the two directives, 
similarly show a disinclination to apply such penalties.273 
If the IRS does not attempt to collect tax under economic 
substance arguments, then taxpayers do not wind up in court on 
economic substance issues, and courts never get involved. In 
that case, the courts will have no opportunity to apply the doc-
trine (unless they find a way to raise it sua sponte, in cases that 
arrive in court for other reasons), and no opportunity to interpret 
section 7701(o)’s effects.274 
Because the IRS’s internal rules that impede agents from 
raising economic substance issues are publicly available,275 the 
                                                                                                            
269 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
However, that directive applies to the Large Business and International Division, 
and not to the other divisions of the IRS. 
270 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
271 Cf. Sheppard, supra note 5 (“In LB&I-04-0711-015, the IRS has instructed 
examiners not to assert the penalty against large business taxpayers. The directive 
accomplishes this by setting insurmountable hurdles in front of agents, some 
of whom, thankfully, seem to be ignoring the instruction.”). 
272 See I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(6)(c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015). 
273 See I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411 (Oct. 4, 2010); I.R.S. No-
tice 2014-58, 2014-44 I.R.B. 746 (Oct. 27, 2014); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4 
-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011); I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-20 
-0910-024, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (Sept. 14, 2010). 
274 See Jensen, supra note 60, at 28. 
275 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
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economic substance doctrine arguably loses any deterrent effect 
on aggressive tax planning (at least for taxpayers under the 
jurisdiction of the relevant IRS division), because taxpayers know 
that the IRS is unlikely to raise the economic substance issue. Of 
course, the IRS’s guidance to its examiners is not binding on the 
IRS and can change at any time. 
The enhanced penalty provisions’ apparent effect on the 
IRS is ironic because stricter penalties—strict liability with no rea-
sonable basis exception—were presumably meant to make the 
consequences of failing the economic substance analysis harsher 
for taxpayers (and possibly to deter hyperaggressive tax plan-
ning),276 not to prevent the doctrine from ever being applied. Also, 
Congress appeared to approve of the economic substance doc-
trine as a tool for judicial safeguarding of Congressional intent, 
rather than intending the doctrine to be applied less frequently 
than it was before codification.277 Congress imposed rules on how 
the doctrine should be applied, but did not indicate in any way 
that courts should stop using the doctrine.278 Instead, the House 
Report accompanying section 7701(o) says that codification was 
meant “to provide greater clarity and uniformity in the applica-
tion of the economic substance doctrine in order to improve its 
effectiveness at deterring unintended consequences.”279 
Congress left the relevance determination to the courts 
rather than limiting the doctrine’s application (and even prevented 
the Treasury from issuing guidance on relevance).280 In fact, 
mandating two prongs (in section 7701(o)) makes the doctrine 
                                                                                                            
276 Congressional budget estimators apparently did not expect the strict 
liability penalties to have a deterrent effect on courts or on IRS enforcement—
presumably, that is why they scored the entire legislative package (section 7701(o) 
and the penalty provision amendments) as a revenue raiser. See Lipton, supra 
note 241, at 325 (noting that “although there was no official breakdown [of the 
revenue estimates between section 7701(o) and its accompanying penalty amend-
ments], it is likely that much of the revenue will be generated by the strict 
liability penalty.”). Congress appears to have expected the penalties to be actu-
ally applied. See generally Jensen, supra note 19, at 30 (the “strict liability 
penalty ... may be more important than the substantive rules in deterring 
questionable taxpayer behavior .... A penalty of that magnitude should be 
enough to get anyone’s attention.”). 
277 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (2010). 
278 See id. See generally I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2012). 
279 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (2010) (emphasis added). 
280 See § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
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tougher, by making it harder for taxpayers to satisfy.281 Requir-
ing that reasonably expected profit be substantial in comparison 
to tax benefits (before profit potential can be taken into account 
in meeting the two prongs) may also have been intended to make 
the doctrine more stringent.282 Thus, Congress may have meant 
to make the economic substance doctrine a stronger safeguard 
for Congressional intent and a better weapon against unintend-
ed tax benefits.283 Instead, the penalty changes enacted in 2010 
have conversely weakened the economic substance doctrine’s im-
pact on taxpayers by making the IRS (very publicly) less willing 
to apply it.284 
Lessening any deterrent effect of the economic substance 
doctrine is arguably a policy problem only in instances where 
economic substance is the only (or strongest) argument against a 
transaction.285 But the economic substance doctrine, by its na-
ture, applies where the literal words of Code and regulatory 
requirements are met,286 and those are exactly the fact patterns 
in which there may be few other strong arguments available to 
the IRS, e.g., few arguments under the words of the Code and 
regulations. There may instead be alternative arguments under 
other anti-abuse rules, such as section 269,287 the partnership 
anti-abuse rules,288 and judicial doctrines such as the business 
purpose and step transaction doctrines.289 Then again, in some 
                                                                                                            
281 See id. § 7701(o)(1); see also Jensen, supra note 60, at 29. 
282 See § 7701(o)(2)(A); see also Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 173. 
283 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295. 
284 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 
2011). See generally Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 
69 TAX L. REV. 73, 124–26 (2015) (discussing agency non-enforcement choices, 
and positing that it is more legitimate for the agency to state clearly its non-
enforcement policies than to keep them hidden). 
285 The IRS internal guidance technically still allows examiners to raise 
the economic substance doctrine in such cases, although it imposes internal 
procedural hurdles even if raising the issue is justified. See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. 
LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
286 See generally supra text accompanying notes 1, 2, 5. 
287 See I.R.C. § 269 (2014). 
288 See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (1995). 
289 See Lipton, supra note 241, at 32 (2010); infra notes 309–10 (discussing 
differences and overlaps between the economic substance doctrine and other 
anti-abuse doctrines, such as the step transaction, substance over form, and 
sham transaction doctrines). 
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fact patterns (e.g., the STARS cases), those alternative arguments 
may be weaker than the economic substance doctrine.290 
Although it appears generally reluctant to raise the eco-
nomic substance doctrine, the IRS is willing to state in regulatory 
preambles that it reserves the right to scrutinize transactions under 
the economic substance doctrine as well as under other judicial 
doctrines.291 Therefore, it has not entirely foreclosed the possibil-
ity of raising the doctrine. It may still be willing to raise econom-
ic substance issues in especially egregious cases. 
In theory, one could challenge the IRS’s stated reluctance to 
apply the economic substance doctrine, which arguably contravenes 
Congressional intent (if the issue of standing could be addressed).292 
But courts have generally been reluctant to review agency inaction, 
                                                                                                            
290 In some of the recent STARS cases, the government began by asserting 
both economic substance arguments and arguments under other anti-abuse 
rules, like section 269. See Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 
844 F.3d 15, 19 n.3 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2295 (2017); Wells 
Fargo & Co. v. United States, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 991, 88-106 (D. Minn. 
2014); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 3d 827, 846–52 (D. 
Minn. 2015). But the trial courts rejected these other anti-abuse arguments. 
See Santander Holdings USA, Inc., 844 F.3d at 19 n.3. At the appellate level 
the government raised only the economic substance issue. It prevailed on that 
issue, regarding challenged foreign tax credits, in the three appellate-level 
STARS opinions. See id.; see also Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 801 F.3d 
104, 120 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. 136 S. Ct. 1375 (2016); Salem 
Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 942, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1366 (2016). One STARS case, Wells Fargo, has yet to be 
heard on appeal. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, No. 09-CV-2764, 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80401, 2017-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50, 235 (D. Minn. May 24, 
2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-3578, No. 17-3676 (8th Cir. Nov. 24, 2017).
291 See, e.g., I.R.S. Rev. Proc. 2013-52 I.R.B. 798 (providing guidance on divi-
dend equivalents under section 871(m), and stating in the preamble that: “The 
Treasury Department and the IRS will continue to closely scrutinize other 
transactions that are not covered by section 871(m) and that may be used to 
avoid U.S. taxation and U.S. withholding. In addition, the IRS may challenge the 
U.S. tax results claimed in connection with transactions that are designed to 
avoid the application of section 871(m) using all available statutory provisions 
and judicial doctrines (including the substance over form doctrine, the economic 
substance doctrine under section 7701(o), the step transaction doctrine, and tax 
ownership principles as appropriate”); I.R.S. Notice CCA 201312045 (Mar. 22, 
2013) (“judicial doctrines, including the economic substance doctrine, can be 
used to challenge a foreign tax credit claim that otherwise meets the tech-
nical requirements of the Internal Revenue Code and relevant regulations”). 
292 See supra text accompanying notes 201, 261 (regarding standing issues). 
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as compared to agency action.293 Agency inaction has previously 
been viewed as an exercise of agency discretion, as part of an 
agency’s use of its expertise to set enforcement priorities.294 
Also, inaction may be viewed as less impactful on members 
of the public than action.295 Depending on the facts, that general 
conclusion might be debatable: IRS refusal to apply the economic 
substance doctrine does not harm the specific taxpayers who en-
gaged in particular (otherwise subject to challenge) transactions, 
but it does harm the U.S. Treasury by giving up on large amounts 
(hundreds of millions) of dollars of tax revenue. In turn, that lack 
of revenue indirectly harms many taxpayers who otherwise would 
have benefitted from the government’s use of those dollars (to keep 
open a military base, hire additional workers, pay food stamp 
benefits, etc.). 
The theory that agency inaction is not reviewable, because 
it is less likely to harm the public (compared to agency action), is 
consistent with the idea that taxpayer-favorable agency deci-
sions should be less subject to review (and less circumscribed) 
than taxpayer-unfavorable agency guidance.296 Yet, as discussed 
above, whether an agency action (or inaction) is taxpayer favor-
able or unfavorable may not be that easy to distinguish, and 
may depend on which taxpayers one focuses on.297 
                                                                                                            
293 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Ar-
bitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1664–75 (2004). However, the re-
sult has sometimes been different where the IRS refuses to issue regulations 
that are required by the statute (where such lack of regulations disadvan-
tages taxpayers). See, e.g., American Air Liquide, Inc. v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 23, 
27 (2001); Int’l Multifoods Corp. v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 25, 38 (1997). 
294 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has recognized 
on several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prose-
cute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision gener-
ally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”). 
295 See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (“when an agency refuses to act it generally 
does not exercise its coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, 
and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect. 
Similarly, when an agency does act to enforce, that action itself provides a focus 
for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have exercised its power in 
some manner.”). 
296 See generally Bressman, supra note 293, at 1664–75 (discussing courts’ 
general reluctance to allow challenges to agency inaction). 
297 Cf. Adam B. Thimmesch, Taxing Honesty, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 147, 177–81 
(2015) (discussing the effects of the non-enforcement of use taxes). 
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Nor is it clear that agencies often decline to enforce an en-
tire statutory section (as opposed to a single sentence, phrase, or 
word within a statutory framework).298 IRS disinclination to apply 
an entire codified doctrine may be especially concerning given the 
clear Congressional intent (evidenced by the enactment of asso-
ciated penalties) that the economic substance doctrine should be 
applied and should be used to collect penalties (thus raising rev-
enue for the Treasury).299 
B. Selected Additional Impacts of Codification 
1. Impact on the Application of Other Anti-abuse Doctrines 
a. May Push the IRS and Courts to Try Other Anti-abuse 
Rules Instead 
Section 7701(o) may have the (apparently unintended) ef-
fect of pushing the courts and the IRS to use other anti-abuse 
rules rather than the economic substance doctrine. The legislative 
history to section 7701(o) states that codification of the economic 
substance doctrine was not meant to affect other judicial anti-
abuse doctrines.300 But the IRS’s desire to avoid imposing the 
section 7701(o)-related penalties (and, to a lesser extent, potential 
restrictions on the economic substance doctrine’s ability to adapt 
over time, after codification)301 may cause an increased emphasis 
on alternative anti-abuse approaches. The courts may similarly 
avoid the economic substance doctrine, if they also attempt to avoid 
the strict liability penalties associated with section 7701(o).  
                                                                                                            
298 See generally Osofsky, supra note 284, at 73–75. 
299 H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (2010); see also supra note 276 and ac-
companying text (discussing revenue estimates). 
300 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 298 (“No inference is intended as to the 
proper application of the economic substance doctrine under present law. In 
addition, the provision shall not be construed as altering or supplanting any 
other rule of law, including any common-law doctrine or provision of the Code 
or regulations or other guidance thereunder; and the provision shall be con-
strued as being additive to any such other rule of law.”); see also JOINT COMM. 
REP., supra note 53, at 15 (same). 
301 See generally Rosenberg, supra note 2 (discussing substantive impact of 
codification). 
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The IRS could try instead to apply statutory anti-abuse rules 
like section 269,302 or judicial anti-abuse doctrines like substance 
over form, business purpose, or the step transaction doctrine.303 
It could also assert regulatory anti-abuse rules that are specific 
to particular tax areas or tax benefits, such as the partnership 
anti-abuse regulations304 (relating to partnership issues). The IRS 
and Treasury could also issue specific new regulations that more 
narrowly target particular transactions, such as the “foreign tax 
credit generator regulations” that responded to the STARS 
transactions.305 
In fact, the IRS appears to be already using alternative 
approaches, rather than the economic substance doctrine, where 
it can.306 IRS guidance to examiners suggests that they not raise 
economic substance as an issue unless it is the only or the strongest 
argument.307 Oddly, the IRS seems as motivated to avoid economic 
substance arguments as taxpayers are.308 
b. Puts More Pressure on Distinguishing Between 
Economic Substance and Other Judicial Doctrines 
Section 7701(o) increases the importance of distinguishing 
between the economic substance doctrine and other judicial anti-
abuse doctrines (such as the substance-over-form, business purpose, 
                                                                                                            
302 See I.R.C. § 269 (2014). The government raised section 269 and similar 
arguments in the lower courts in some of the STARS cases, but lost on these 
issues in the trial courts and did not pursue such arguments on appeal. See 
Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 3d 239 (D. 
Mass. 2015), rev’d, 844 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2016), and cert. denied, 2017 U.S. 
LEXIS 4194 (June 26, 2017); Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 
15 (2013), on rehearing, T.C. Memo. 2013-225, and aff’d, 801 F.3rd 104 (2d. Cir. 
2015), and cert. denied sub nom. 136 S. Ct. 1375 (2016); Salem Fin., Inc. v. United 
States, 786 F. 3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1366 (2016). 
303 Notices 2004-19 and 2004-20, for example, contain lists of rules and 
doctrines (other than the economic substance doctrine) that the IRS might 
apply in situations that it finds abusive. I.R.S. Notice 2004-19, 2004-11 I.R.B. 
606; I.R.S. Notice 2004-20, 2004-11 I.R.B 608. 
304 See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (1995). 
305 See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(iv); see also Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 
235–49 (discussing possible alternative approaches the Treasury could take, 
by regulation, to address foreign tax credit claims that are seen as abusive). 
306 Jensen, supra note 60, at 30. 
307 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). 
308 Id. 
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step transaction,309 and sham transaction310 doctrines). That in-
quiry was mostly of theoretical interest before.311 Historically, 
                                                                                                            
309 See Summa Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 848 F.3d 779, 785 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(discussing the substance over form doctrine and declining to apply it to disallow 
tax benefits from a transaction, where the transaction predated section 
7701(o)’s effective date); CNT Inv’rs v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 161, 192–93 (2015) 
(discussing the overlap and distinctions between step transaction and sham 
transaction doctrines for a transaction before the effective date of section 7701(o)); 
In re Wyly, 552 B.R. 338, 514–16 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2016) (discussing the economic 
substance, substance over form, and step transaction doctrines, regarding a 
transaction that occurred before section 7701(o)’s effective date). See generally 
Philip Sancilio, Note, Clarifying (or is it Codifying?) the “Notably Abstruse”: Step 
Transactions, Economic Substance, and the Tax Code, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 138, 
148–49 (2013) (comparing post-section 7701(o) economic substance doctrine 
with the step transaction doctrine). 
310 Unlike the other doctrines listed in the text above, the sham transac-
tion doctrine is sometimes used as an interchangeable term for the economic 
substance doctrine. At other times, sham transaction doctrine has a different 
meaning than economic substance. Such different meanings can include factual 
shams, in which the alleged events (such as sales or indebtedness) did not actually 
occur, as compared to economic or substantive shams, in which the alleged events 
did occur but arguably did not have the asserted tax effects. See Knetsch v. 
United States, 364 United States 361, 366 (1960) (using the “sham” terminology 
while disallowing tax benefits related to purported debt); Goldstein v. Comm’r, 
364 F.2d 734, 737–42 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that loans and interest were not 
“shams,” but that interest deductions were disallowed as lacking sufficient sub-
stance). See generally Jasper L. Cummings, The Sham Transaction Doctrine, 
145 TAX NOTES 1239, 1242 (2014); Karen Nelson Moore, Sham Transaction Doc-
trine: An Outmoded and Unnecessary Approach to Combating Tax Avoidance, 
41 FLA. L. REV. 659, 659 (1989). 
311 See, e.g., Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. U.S., 844 F.3d 15, 21 n.9 (1st 
Cir. 2016) (“The First Circuit has addressed challenges to the economic sub-
stance of transactions in a number of cases, although the cases often have not 
invoked the ‘economic substance doctrine’ by that name.”) (citations omitted). 
Santander describes the Supreme Court’s Frank Lyon opinion as “clari-
fy[ing]” the economic substance doctrine, even though the Frank Lyon case 
referred to “this doctrine of substance over form.” See Frank Lyon Co. v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978); see also CNT Inv’rs, 144 T.C. at 192–
93 (applying the step transaction doctrine, discussing the evolution of various 
doctrines from Gregory, and stating that “[t]he parties’ arguments implicate 
three closely related and frequently conflated legal doctrines: the economic 
substance doctrine, the sham transaction doctrine, and the step transaction 
doctrine. Although these doctrines’ distinct names might suggest correspond-
ing substantive distinctions, the lines between and among them blur upon 
examination ....”); H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 292 (2010) (“These common-law 
 
2018] ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE 257 
there has been substantial overlap between various anti-abuse 
doctrines (such as substance-over-form, business purpose, step 
transaction, and economic substance), and it is not always easy 
to distinguish them from each other.312 In the past, it has not 
mattered much—if a tax benefit was disallowed under a judicial 
anti-abuse doctrine, the precisely accurate name of that doctrine 
was not important.313 That is likely to change now that section 
7701(o) has taken effect.314 
First, the imposition of enhanced penalties (twenty or forty 
percent, with no reasonable cause exception) for tax deficiencies 
asserted under the economic substance doctrine315 may increase the 
need to distinguish between economic substance (and “similar 
                                                                                                            
doctrines are not entirely distinguishable, and their application to a given set 
of facts is often blurred by the courts, the IRS, and litigants.”). The court in 
CNT Investors did not apply the economic substance doctrine “because the 
Government has not invoked the doctrine and because, in any event, the case 
may be resolved through the application of other principles.” CNT Inv’rs, 144 
T.C. at 197 n.38. The court referred to Notice 2014-58 as demonstrating the 
“remaining uncertainty as to the scope, contours, and sources of economic 
substance and the other, noncodified judicial doctrines.” Id. at 193. The case 
concerned a transaction that occurred before section 7701(o)’s effective date, 
so the strict liability penalties enacted with that section would not have ap-
plied even if the judge had chosen to raise the economic substance doctrine 
sua sponte. 
312 See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 
2011). 
313 See id. 
314 See Amy S. Elliott, CNT Investors Shines Light on Courts’ Use of Inex-





act%20Doctrines (quoting practitioner Monte Jackel’s comments on the CNT 
Investors case: “‘This judge is basically admitting that many times these judges 
don’t know which doctrine they’re applying,’ Jackel said. He questioned whether 
such an approach can survive in a post-codified economic substance doctrine 
world.”); Elliott, supra note 16 (discussing a practitioner’s complaint that the 
court in Kenna Trading LLC et al. v. Commissioner should have used the sub-
stance over form doctrine rather than the economic substance doctrine: “Gomez 
noted that while the opinion uses the words ‘economic substance,’ it does so as 
part of what’s really a substance-over-form analysis, making the use of those 
words ‘unfortunate.’”). 
315 See I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(6), (c), 6676 (2018); § 6664(d) (2015). 
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rules of law”)316 on the one hand, and other judicial anti-abuse doc-
trines on the other,317 in order to determine whether such en-
hanced penalties apply. 
Secondly, only the economic substance doctrine triggers the 
specific rules of section 7701(o) (two prongs, substantial reasonably 
expected profit required before profit potential can be consid-
ered, substantial non-tax purpose, rules about whether financial 
accounting and state tax effects can be taken into account, 
etc.).318 If either the government or the taxpayer wants to avoid 
the rules of section 7701(o), that party could argue that another 
Code or regulatory rule, or another judicial doctrine, applies instead 
of the economic substance analysis.319 
Therefore, the distinction between the economic substance 
doctrine and other judicial anti-abuse doctrines can now affect 
whether the taxpayer wins or loses (as well as impacting penal-
ties) by determining whether section 7701(o) (and its associated 
penalties) must be applied.320 Section 7701(o) may thus have the 
effect of opening up new lines of analysis for courts, commentators, 
                                                                                                            
316 Tax deficiencies attributable to “similar rules of law” are subject to the same 
strict liability penalties as deficiencies arising under the economic substance 
doctrine (as defined in section 7701(o)). See §§ 6662(b)(6), (c), 6676; § 6664(d). 
However, the IRS has indicated that there are no other anti-abuse rules or 
doctrines that it will treat as similar doctrines, practically speaking. See supra 
discussion at Section II.B; supra notes 130–47 and accompanying text. 
317 See, e.g., Vanik, supra note 123, at 110–11 (if taxpayers must pay a tax defi-
ciency, they may be motivated to characterize the deficiency as arising under 
other judicial doctrines rather than under the economic substance doctrine, 
in order to avoid the strict liability penalties associated with the latter). 
318 See generally § 7701(o) (2012). 
319 See Vanik, supra note 123, at 111. 
320 Query how often a taxpayer might be able to win a challenge based on 
another judicial anti-abuse doctrine when it would have lost on 7701(o)-impacted 
economic substance. A full discussion of that possibility is beyond the scope of 
this Article. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 298 (2010) (section 7701(o) “shall not 
be construed as altering or supplanting any other rule of law, including any 
common-law doctrine or provision of the Code or regulations or other guid-
ance thereunder; and the provision shall be construed as being additive to any 
such other rule of law”); Jensen, supra note 19, at 25, n.148 (discussing the po-
tential impact of the codification of the economic substance doctrine on other 
doctrines, including whether Congress intended to favor economic substance 
over other doctrines, and pointing out that the Joint Committee report disclaims 
any Congressional intent to alter the application of any other doctrines by codify-
ing the economic substance doctrine). 
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and taxpayers, regarding the definitions of and distinctions be-
tween various judicial anti-abuse doctrines, due to increased em-
phasis on such distinctions.321 
2. Impact on Validity of the Economic Substance Doctrine 
Another interesting issue raised by section 7701(o) is 
whether it affects the legal strength of arguments about the validity 
of the economic substance doctrine.322 Both before and after section 
7701(o), various commentators argued that the economic substance 
doctrine is not a valid exercise of judicial authority.323 The Coltec 
lower court also accepted such an argument, on the grounds that 
separation of powers prevented such actions by the courts.324 
The validity issue could be viewed as moot in that case, because 
the court held that the transaction met the economic substance 
test in any event and therefore should be respected.325 This lower 
court opinion was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, which held that the doctrine of economic substance is 
valid and that the transaction failed to meet such doctrine’s re-
quirements.326 The House Report accompanying section 7701(o) 
describes the lower and appellate court opinions in Coltec, with-
out commenting on any potential impact of section 7701(o) on 
                                                                                                            
321 The IRS second directive to its employees suggests that examiners use 
a different doctrine if available. See I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I 1-4-0711-015, 
IRM 20.1.1, 20.1.5 (July 15, 2011). This only helps taxpayers avoid the en-
hanced penalties if such alternative doctrine is not “similar” to the economic 
substance doctrine within the meaning of the enhanced penalty provisions and 
Notice 2014-58. Id. 
322 This discussion focuses on the narrower issue of the impact of section 
7701(o) on arguments about the validity of the economic substance doctrine. 
A complete discussion of the merits of such validity arguments is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
323 See, e.g., Jasper L. Cummings, The Supreme Court’s Economic Substance 
Doctrine Opinion, 149 TAX NOTES 1295, 1295–97 (2015) (continuing to argue that 
the economic substance doctrine is invalid, even after the enactment of section 
7701(o)); Amandeep S. Grewal, Economic Substance and the Supreme Court, 116 
TAX NOTES 969, 970 (2007) (contending that the economic substance doctrine is 
invalid under Supreme Court case law and principles of statutory interpretation). 
324 See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 753 (2004), va-
cated and remanded, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
325 Id. at 755–56. 
326 Coltec Indus., Inc., 454 F.3d at 1360. 
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validity arguments.327 Perhaps Congress thought that either the 
appellate reversal of the lower court’s Coltec opinion, or codifica-
tion, ended any concerns about the validity of the doctrine. 
Whether section 7701(o) changes taxpayers’ and courts’ 
ability to argue that the economic substance doctrine is always 
invalid—i.e., never applies, because the courts do not have the legal 
ability to apply such a doctrine—depends on the asserted reason 
for such invalidity. The statute’s enactment quite clearly signals 
Congressional approval of the economic substance doctrine (even 
though the doctrine was developed by the courts and did not origi-
nate with Congress).328 This is especially important because the 
economic substance doctrine’s function is the interpretation of 
Congressional intent.329 
Therefore, arguments for invalidity on the grounds that the 
economic substance doctrine violates Congressional intent should 
decrease in force.330 (Similar arguments about Congressional intent 
                                                                                                            
327 H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 293 (2010). 
328 The House Report describes the reason for enacting section 7701(o) as 
follows: 
A strictly rule-based tax system cannot efficiently prescribe 
the appropriate outcome of every conceivable transaction that 
might be devised and is, as a result, incapable of preventing all 
unintended consequences. Thus, many courts have long recog-
nized the need to supplement tax rules with anti-tax-avoidance 
standards, such as the economic substance doctrine, in order to 
assure the Congressional purpose is achieved. The Committee 
recognizes that the IRS has achieved a number of recent suc-
cesses in litigation. The Committee believes it is still desirable to 
provide greater clarity and uniformity in the application of the 
economic substance doctrine in order to improve its effective-
ness at deterring unintended consequences. 
H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (emphasis added). That certainly sounds like 
Congressional approval. In fact, the House specifically said that it wanted the 
economic substance doctrine to be more effective. Id. 
329 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
330 Some commentators argued that codification would actually prevent any 
further challenges to the validity of the economic substance doctrine, although 
courts could still find that the doctrine was not applicable to particular fact 
patterns. See, e.g., Linda D. Jellum, Codifying and “Miscodifying” Judicial Anti-
Abuse Doctrines, 33 VA. TAX REV. 579, 586 (2014) (“For those judges, particu-
larly textualists, who may have been hesitant to impose the judicially created 
doctrines, codification removes their choice.”); see also Marvin A. Chirelstein 
& Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 
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may still be available as part of a separate “relevance” inquiry by 
the courts, in particular cases. But relevance pertains to whether a 
specific type of tax benefit, like the low income housing credit, 
was not intended to be subject to economic substance scrutiny. It 
does not address whether the entire doctrine of economic substance 
is invalid and therefore never applies.). In order for a court to 
decide that the economic substance doctrine never applies to any 
transaction (due to invalidity), a court now would have to over-
come government arguments that section 7701(o) shows Congres-
sional approval of the doctrine. In other words, the court would 
need a reason for invalidity that does not depend on an asserted 
violation of Congressional intent. 331 
However, section 7701(o) might not affect the strength of 
an argument that separation of powers principles (rather than 
Congressional intent) do not allow the courts to override compli-
ance with the literal rules of the Code and regulations. One could 
argue that Congress cannot waive that issue.332 Regardless of the 
merits of such arguments about the separation of powers, such 
merits likely are not significantly changed by the enactment of 
section 7701(o). 
Alternatively, the economic substance doctrine could po-
tentially be viewed as a rule of statutory interpretation333 (perhaps 
                                                                                                            
COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1950 (2005) (discussing, before section 7701(o)’s enact-
ment, the possible impact of future codification: “Although codification would 
prevent a court from concluding that the doctrine does not exist, courts would 
remain free to conclude that the doctrine is not relevant in particular situa-
tions.”). But treating section 7701(o) as ending validity arguments seems to be 
an overstatement, because there may be some asserted grounds for invalidity 
of the doctrine that are not waivable by Congress, as well as the arguments 
(discussed infra) that Congress could not amend a judicial doctrine that did 
not already exist. 
331 In addition, in response to arguments that the courts cannot (are not 
authorized by Congress to) disallow benefits that meet all of the technical re-
quirements of the Code, the IRS can argue that section 7701(o) (and its two 
prongs and other rules) are now part of the literal, technical requirements to 
receive certain tax benefits. 
332 If Congress cannot waive any separation of powers issue that affects 
the economic substance doctrine, perhaps it could not enact a general anti-abuse 
rule (GAAR) either. 
333 For example, Santander characterized the economic substance doctrine 
as a rule of statutory interpretation. See Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. 
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akin to the rule that courts do not give effect to proposed interpreta-
tions that are manifestly incompatible with Congressional intent, 
or that are nonsensical).334 If that is the case, then section 7701(o) 
potentially strengthens arguments in favor of the economic sub-
stance doctrine’s validity, by showing Congressional approval of 
such an economic substance rule of statutory construction. 
On the one hand, section 7701(o)’s phrasing seems to as-
sume that the economic substance doctrine exists and is valid.335 
On the other, it does not purport to create such a doctrine itself, 
if the economic substance doctrine was already (before enactment) 
invalid.336 Instead, section 7701(o) asserts that it only clarifies 
(according to the statutory provision’s title) or “clarif[ies] and en-
hance[s]” (in the words of the legislative history)337 an existing 
doctrine. But if Congress was wrong about economic substance 
existing as a valid judicial doctrine, that would make section 7701(o) 
entirely meaningless. Such a judicial finding of invalidity of the 
                                                                                                            
United States, 844 F.3d 15, 15 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal footnotes omitted) 
(“The federal income tax is, and always has been, based on statute. The eco-
nomic substance doctrine, like other common law tax doctrines, can thus 
perhaps best be thought of as a tool of statutory interpretation ....”). 
334 See, e.g., Gardner v. Comm’r, 954 F.2d 836, 838 (2d Cir. 1992) (per cu-
riam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992) (citing statutory construction rules 
against finding absurd results, in support of court’s application of the eco-
nomic substance doctrine); Lerman v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 44, 54–55 (3d Cir. 
1991) (same), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 590 (1991). See generally Veronica M. 
Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Re-
sult Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 127 (1994); Steven 
Wisotsky, How to Interpret Statutes—Or Not: Plain Meaning and Other Phan-
toms, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 321 (2009); Robert W. Scheef, Temporal 
Dynamics in Statutory Interpretation: Courts, Congress, and the Canon of Consti-
tutional Avoidance, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 529, 555 (2003). 
335 See I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2018). 
336 See id. 
337 See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 295 (2010); see also JT. COMM. ON 
TAX’N, JCX-18-10, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF 
THE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010, AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE 
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 156 (2010) (saying that section 
7701(o) “clarified and enhanced” the economic substance doctrine). Section 
7701(o)’s own title says that it is a “clarification,” but it was enacted by sec-
tion 1409 of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, which 
referred to “Codification.” Although enhancement, clarification, and codification 
differ somewhat in their meaning, all connote that the economic substance doc-
trine already existed, and was not newly created by section 7701(o). 
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economic substance doctrine would thus need a rationale strong 
enough to overcome the bias against finding statutory language to 
be moot, under general principles of statutory interpretation.338 
Taxpayers might potentially argue that by leaving relevance 
to the courts “as if this subsection had never been enacted,”339 
section 7701(o) leaves the courts to determine the validity of the 
doctrine and implies that it might be invalid.340 But relevance and 
validity are two different concepts. The relevance rule addresses 
not whether the economic substance doctrine is valid (i.e., exists) 
but whether specific tax benefits are exempt from application of the 
doctrine. Section 7701(o) applies only when the economic sub-
stance doctrine is “relevant.”341 As quoted above, the rule leaving 
the relevance determination to the courts says that courts can 
determine “whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant to 
a transaction.”342 The phrasing indicates a case-specific deter-
mination for each transaction. This language appears to assume 
that the doctrine is valid and to focus instead on whether such 
valid doctrine applies to a particular transaction or not. Other-
wise, relevance issues do not appear to affect arguments about 
the underlying validity of the economic substance doctrine. 
There is also an argument that, even if the economic sub-
stance doctrine were found to technically not have existed (to have 
been invalid) before section 7701(o)’s enactment, it exists (is valid) 
after section 7701(o). Under this theory, one would argue that 
Congress essentially created an economic substance test (or cre-
ated a modified version of a test that had existed, in differing forms, 
in the various circuits) and that (after codification) Congress 
                                                                                                            
338 See supra note 132 and accompanying text; cf. Marie Sapirie, News 
Analysis: Will the Supreme Court Take Up Economic Substance?, 150 TAX NOTES 
36 (2016) (“‘Section 7701(o) begins by saying that the doctrine applies only when 
it is relevant and thus seems to confer congressional imprimatur on the notion 
that the doctrine is part of common law,’ said Monte A. Jackel of Jackel Tax Law. 
‘If there is no such doctrine, then Congress acted unnecessarily,’ he said.”). 
339 See § 7701(o)(1) (lead-in language) (“In the case of any transaction to which 
the economic substance doctrine is relevant ….”); id. § 7701(o)(5)(C) (“The determi-
nation of whether the economic substance doctrine is relevant to a transaction 
shall be made in the same manner as if this subsection had never been enacted.”). 
340 For an example of such an argument, see Cummings, supra note 323, 
at text accompanying n.52. 
341 See § 7701(o). 
342 See id. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
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allowed the courts to decide only whether the doctrine applies to 
particular transactions, not whether it exists at all. This argu-
ment derives some support from the fact that Congress imposed 
some significant changes on the previous forms of the doctrine—
including the ratio test that must be met before profit potential 
can be taken into account under either prong.343 One could argue 
that section 7701(o) itself authorizes the judiciary to apply two 
prongs to evaluate asserted tax benefits where the courts think 
such analysis is appropriate (i.e., relevant), even if the economic 
substance doctrine were found not to have existed before.  
Overall, although arguments about the validity or invalid-
ity of economic substance as a judicial doctrine are interesting, it 
seems extremely unlikely that the courts would hold the doc-
trine to be invalid, given the many, many times that multiple 
circuits have applied the doctrine without finding it invalid or 
raising this issue.344 The Supreme Court has not itself decided a 
recent case that uses the term “economic substance,” but it has ap-
plied similar approaches and doctrines (e.g., “substance over form” 
in Frank Lyon,345 and a basic anti-abuse concept in Gregory).346 
One element that these previous Supreme Court decisions have 
in common with the economic substance doctrine (among other 
things) is a willingness to consider whether a tax benefit that meets 
all of the written Code and regulatory requirements should 
nonetheless be denied.347 
In any event, even if section 7701(o) leaves open the pos-
sibility that the Supreme Court could find that the economic sub-
stance doctrine does not exist (despite dozens of court cases), e.g., 
because it is not within the courts’ power to create such a doctrine, 
that might not be the end of the economic substance analysis. 
Congress could potentially just amend section 7701(o) to create an 
economic substance rule, similar to a GAAR.348 Instead of a judicial 
                                                                                                            
343 Id. § 7701(o)(2)(A). 
344 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 293 (2010). 
345 See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978). 
346 See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). 
347 See Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 573; Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469. 
348 See generally Graeme S. Cooper, International Experience with General 
Anti-Avoidance Rules, 54 SMU L. REV. 83, 117 (2001) (discussing GAARs gener-
ally); Tim Edgar, Building a Better GAAR, 27 VA. TAX REV. 833 (2008); Daniel 
Halperin, Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?, 48 TAX LAW 807, 809 (1995); Zoe 
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doctrine, economic substance would become primarily a statutory 
rule. Section 7701(o) certainly shows Congressional approval of (a 
version of) the economic substance doctrine, so Congressional 
amendments to create such a statutory doctrine (if the judicial 
doctrine is overturned) seem quite possible, as long as the rea-
son for invalidity is something other than separation of powers 
issues. Thus, debates about validity or invalidity of the judicial 
doctrine may ultimately be moot (because any finding of invalid-
ity may simply be superseded by later legislation).349 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
Section 7701(o) incorporated the long-standing doctrine of 
economic substance into statutory language. Such “codification” 
is a rare instance of legislation that mandates the content of a 
court-created doctrine, and that also gives an agency the regula-
tory authority to change and impact that judicial doctrine. Codi-
fication thus raises issues regarding the interaction of the three 
branches of the federal government.  
In addition, Congress apparently expected that codifica-
tion of the economic substance doctrine would strengthen the 
doctrine and result in increased federal tax revenues, partly as a 
result of strict liability penalties that were enacted with section 
7701(o).350 Instead, such penalties seem to have deterred the IRS 
from raising the economic substance doctrine, so that codifica-
tion has weakened the economic substance doctrine rather than 
making it a stronger weapon for tax collection. Section 7701(o) 
thus presents interesting issues regarding the bounds of agency 
authority and agency enforcement discretion. 
The IRS’s publicly communicated reluctance to raise eco-
nomic substance issues, implemented by means of internal letters, 
and its notices (which state, among other things, that the IRS will 
                                                                                                            
Prebble & John Prebble, Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance Rule of Income 
Tax Law with the Civil Law Doctrine of Abuse of Law, 62 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 
(Apr. 2008) (describing GAARs in other countries). 
349 Even if validity arguments are moot in the long term (because Congress 
could choose to create, rather than just modify, an economic substance doctrine 
in the future), current validity arguments may still be crucial for particular 
taxpayers, who could benefit from arguing that the economic substance doc-
trine is invalid for the years in which their transactions occurred. 
350 See supra text accompanying notes 272–73. 
266 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:199 
continue to apply pre-section-7701(o) case law), also raise questions 
about the issuance of rules by informal means, without notice and 
comment procedures. 
The strict liability penalties associated with section 7701(o), 
in addition to IRS disinclination to raise economic substance issues, 
may encourage courts and government litigators to turn to other 
doctrines where they might previously have raised economic sub-
stance issues. Section 7701(o) may thus make it more important 
to distinguish between anti-abuse doctrines in the future, com-
pared to pre-codification periods. 
Lastly, section 7701(o) clearly signals Congressional approval 
of the judicial doctrine of economic substance.351 This hinders 
arguments that the economic substance doctrine is invalid, ex-
cept to the extent that such contentions are based on separation 
of powers issues or other grounds that the Congress does not 
have the ability to waive. 
Overall, section 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code (which 
now governs the application of the economic substance doctrine) 
seems to have had the unintended effect of causing the economic 
substance doctrine (and the recently enacted penalties associated 
with that doctrine) to be applied very rarely. Rather than merely 
translating the existing economic substance doctrine into legisla-
tive language, or strengthening it, section 7701(o) seems to have 
accidentally deterred the agency from raising the issue. Although 
there are valid arguments about the agency’s ability to make (and 
publicly communicate) these enforcement and interpretation 
choices, few litigants are likely to bring a legal challenge against 
such taxpayer-favorable agency action.  
The economic substance doctrine may thus be restricted in 
the future, as a practical matter, to the “worst of the worst” cases, 
in which claims for unintended tax benefits appear truly egregious. 
Those may be the only instances in which the agency is still will-
ing to assert the doctrine. No case has yet interpreted section 
7701(o). If the IRS remains willing to apply economic substance 
arguments to the most egregious cases, then judicial examination 
of section 7701(o) may take place soon. 
                                                                                                            
351 See H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 293 (2010). 
